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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (1999). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly dismiss plaintiffs causes of action as against 
American States when it found under the undisputed facts that American States did not 
qualify as a "seller," "supplier" or "dealer" for purposes of plaintiff s statutory claims, 
and that American States had no relationship, contractual or otherwise, with plaintiff. 
2. Was the trial court within its broad discretion when it denied plaintiffs 
Rule 56(f) motion when the parties had conducted nine months of discovery and the trial 
court found that the motion was not well taken where additional discovery could not 
address the legal issues raised by American States' Summary Judgment Motion. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. An appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, affording no special deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Girbich 
v. Numed Inc.. 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). 
2. An appellate court reviews the trial court's denial of plaintiff s Rule 
56(f) Motion for abuse of discretion. See Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 
(Utah 1994); Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Under this standard an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision unless the 
1 
decision exceeds the limits of reasonability. See Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 930 
(UtahCt.App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
This case involves the application of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act as found in 
the Utah Code Ann. §§ 4l-la-1001-1005 (1999). This case involves the application of 
the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act as found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-3-
102, 103, 201 and 702 (1999). This case involves the interpretation of the several 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code as found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 70a-2-
104, 106 and 313 (1999). Finally, this case involves the interpretation of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act as found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-3 through 5 and 
§13-11-19 (1999). These provisions are attached in the addendum to this brief if such 
provisions have not already been provided in the addendum to the Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
This appeal arises from Appellant James Gordon Holmes' ("Holmes") 
purchase of a 1994 American General Hummer ("Hummer") vehicle which he knew had 
been involved in an automobile accident. (R. 1-10, 585). The trial court found that 
under the undisputed facts Holmes' Complaint did not state a cause of action against 
American States. (R. 645-648, 871-72). 
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On February 4, 1997, Holmes filed a complaint against American States 
Insurance Company ("American States") and others, alleging that American States had 
violated the Utah Commercial Code, the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, the Utah 
Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act and had breached fiduciary duties when Holmes 
received an 'unbranded' title to the Hummer. (R. 585). After the parties had conducted 
over nine months of discovery, American States filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on October 22, 1997. (R. 154-55, 586). American States' Motion argued that Holmes' 
statutory claims did not apply to them as they were neither the 'seller' 'dealer' nor the 
'supplier' of Holmes' Hummer vehicle. (R. 152-55, 578-595). 
On October 27, 1997, Holmes filed a Rule 56(f) Motion. (R. 199-200, 586). 
On January 30, 1998, the trial court denied Holmes' Rule 56(f) Motion for a 
continuance, determining that the Motion was not well-taken and that further discovery 
was not necessary to address the legal issues raised in American States' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 572-74, 586). However, the court did grant Holmes an 
extension to March 9, 1998 to respond to American States' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 572-574). 
On June 10, 1998, Judge Wilkinson granted American States partial summary 
judgment and dismissed Holmes' alleged causes of action arising under the Utah 
Commercial Code, the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act and the Utah Motor Vehicle 
Business Regulation Act and dismissed Holmes' claim based on fiduciary duty. (R. 
3 
648). The court found that American States did not qualify as a 'seller' to Holmes under 
the Uniform Commercial Code. (R. 646). The court found that American States did not 
qualify as a 'supplier' as contemplated under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(R. 646). The court determined that Holmes did not have a cause of action arising under 
the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act as American States was not a 'dealer' 
and had not misled or fraudulently certified to Holmes that the Hummer was entitled to 
an 'unbranded' title as contemplated under the Act. (R. 645-648). The court found that 
the only remaining issue was whether the fact that Holmes was supplied with an 
'unbranded' title led to an alleged failure of Holmes to receive a manufacturer warranty. 
(R. 645-649). 
On September 18, 1998, American States filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to the remaining issue in the case. (R. 657-658). In that motion, American 
States showed that it had performed no act that impaired the validity of the 
manufacturer's warranty. (R. 730-32, 778-79, 895). On October 5, 1998, Holmes filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration of the court's partial summary judgment order. (R. 693-
707). On January 22, 1999, Judge Wilkinson reconsidered the previous pleadings and 
arguments in the case pursuant to Holmes' Motion to Reconsider, and affirmed his June 
10, 1998 grant of partial summary judgment. (R. 871). In addition, the court granted 
American States' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the remaining issue in the case. 
(R. 871-872). The court found that American States' acts or omissions did not cause 
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Holmes to lose any benefit of the manufacturer's warranty on the Hummer. Accordingly, 
Holmes had no cause of action against American States as to whether the fact that 
Holmes applied for and received an 'unbranded' title led to any failure of Holmes to 
receive a manufacturer warranty. (R. 649, 871-872). 
On February 22, 1999, Holmes filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court 
appealing the trial court's entry of Partial Summary Judgment on June 10, 1998, the trial 
court's denial of Holmes' Rule 56(f) Motion as well as the court's entry of Summary 
Judgment on January 22, 1999. (R. 880-81). On June 9, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this action to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. (R. 890). 
B. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
The genesis of this case arises out of an automobile accident involving a 
Hummer vehicle that occurred on August 11, 1995. American States was the insurer of 
the Hummer prior to the accident. Following the accident, the vehicle was towed by 
Intermountain Tow to the Hummer dealership at Carleson Cadillac ("Carleson") in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (R. 381, 390-91, 579). American States elected to pay its insured the 
pre-accident value of the vehicle to settle the claim for accident damages. (Id). Appellee 
Economy Auto Incorporated ("Economy"), an automobile dealer in the state of Utah, 
acquired the Hummer through a bidding process handled through Intermountain Tow. 
(R. 581, 647). Appellee Clarendon National Insurance Company ("Clarendon") issued 
the motor vehicle dealer bond for Economy. (R. 3, 8, 380). 
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Holmes examined and photographed the Hummer while it was stored at 
Carleson. (R. 579-580). While inspecting the Hummer, Holmes inquired of Carleson 
whether the vehicle was for sale. Carleson referred Holmes to American States who told 
Holmes they were unsure of what they would do with the vehicle. (R. 581). Holmes 
testified that: 
I called [the American States representative] on the phone and I 
asked her if they were going to sell the vehicle. And she said, we 
don't know what we're going to do with the vehicle. And that was 
the end of the conversation. We never spoke again. 
(R. 581). Holmes would never again communicate with or receive representations from 
American States until after his purchase of the Hummer. (R. 581, 647). 
After Economy purchased the vehicle, Holmes contacted its principal and 
made an offer to purchase the Hummer for $15,000 which was not accepted by 
Economy. (R. 581-83). Thereafter, Economy opted to consign the vehicle to an auto 
auction operated by Western Affiliated, not a party to this action. (R. 583, 894). The 
Hummer was subsequently purchased by Hillcrest Services, not a party to this action, at 
the auto auction. (R. 583, 647). Holmes attended this same auto auction and observed 
the Hummer while it was there, but did not purchase the vehicle. (R. 647). After 
researching the value of the Hummer, Holmes ultimately purchased the Hummer from 
Hillcrest Services in November, 1995. (R. 5, 583, 584). 
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Holmes received an assignment of title and he took that to the State of Utah 
and applied for an 'unbranded' title. (R. 583). Holmes' bill of sale indicated that the 
Hummer was sold "as accepted" and was not "guaranteed." (R. 162, 647). Holmes 
purchased the vehicle in the same condition as he had seen it at the Carleson dealership 
and at the auto auction. (R. 583, 648). Holmes admitted that he knew the vehicle was 
being sold in its damaged condition for salvage, and was in the exact same condition as 
when he inspected and photographed the Hummer at Carleson and at the auto auction. 
(R. 585, 648). 
Holmes is experienced in the mechanics and repair of vehicles. (R. 584). He 
owns approximately 50 vehicles that he uses and makes available for movie production 
and other uses. (R. 585). Holmes proceeded to make repairs to the Hummer, including 
replacement of the hood, the windshield frame, the doors, the wheels, the quarter panel, 
the top assembly and fixed numerous dents along the Hummer's sides. (R. 583). 
After repairing the above-referenced items on the vehicle himself, Holmes 
attempted to have certain warranty work performed on the Hummer at Carleson. When 
he did so, he was allegedly told by someone at Carleson that the manufacturer's warranty 
on the vehicle had been voided because of the vehicle had been "scrapped." (R. 506-
507). Thereafter, Holmes filed this lawsuit against American States alleging damages 
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because he had applied for and received an 'unbranded title' from the State of Utah. (R. 
1-10).1 
The parties conducted discovery for approximately nine months. In response 
to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, American States provided 
Holmes with all documentation pertaining to how the loss was adjusted by American 
States with its insured. (R. 225-79, 306-46). American States also supplied Holmes with 
information on the chain of sale between American States, Intermountain Tow, 
Economy, and the other dealer entities. (Id.). 
American States then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that 
Holmes' causes of action based upon American States' alleged violations of Utah 
statutes should be dismissed as a matter of law. Thereafter, Holmes filed a Rule 56(f) 
Motion and a Motion to Compel Discovery. (R. 193). The parties fully briefed both 
motions and argued the same before the trial court. 
At the hearing on the matter, the trial court looked at the issue pertaining to 
the chain of title and the documentation showing the way in which American States 
adjusted the loss. (R. 572-74, 893). The trial court determined that the additional 
discovery sought by Holmes would have no bearing on the legal issues raised by 
1
 It is important to note that Holmes has subsequently sold the Hummer to 
another purchaser. Holmes sold the Hummer with the 'unbranded' title that he had 
originally applied for and received from the State of Utah. 
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American States' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.). Holmes had already been 
provided material regarding the chain of sale and documentation pertaining to the 
adjustment of loss. (R. 225-79, 306-46). Holmes had the opportunity to perform 
additional discovery and never requested such until American States filed the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 572-74, 893). Therefore, the trial court denied Holmes' 56(f) 
Motion and Motion to Compel Discovery. (R. 572-74). The court granted Holmes a six-
week extension in which to respond to American States Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Ultimately, the court granted American States Partial Summary Judgment and 
dismissed Holmes' alleged causes of action arising under the Utah Commercial Code, the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act and the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation 
Act. (R. 648). However, the court left one issue in the case: Whether American States 
performed any act or omission which caused Holmes to lose the benefit of the 
manufacturer's warranty. (Tr. of Hr'g on Defs'. Mot. for Summ J. at 35, attached to 
appellant's brief in the addendum). 
American States then moved for summary judgment as to this remaining issue 
in the case. (R. 657-661). American General, the manufacturer of the vehicle 
established via affidavit that the Hummer's warranty was in full effect throughout the 
entire manufacturer warranty period. Therefore, the manufacturer's warranty expired on 
its own terms. (R. 730-32, 778-79, 895). In addition, Carleson Cadillac established that 
any notation on the dealership's computers or invoices that the Hummer had been 
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'scrapped' or that the warranty was void, was in error and was not an official act of the 
dealership or the manufacturer. (R. 662, 730-32, 778-79, 895). 
Holmes submitted an affidavit from a parts repairman, Christopher Haderlie, 
out of Jackson, Wyoming. Haderlie testified that he contacted AM General on an 
unknown date and spoke with an unknown person about the Hummer's warranty. He 
was allegedly informed that the Hummer's warranty had been deleted from the AM 
General system. (R.726, 765-69). The court found that the Haderlie affidavit was 
hearsay. Nevertheless, the trial court considered the same in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 871, 894). Despite the fact that Holmes submitted a 
contradictory affidavit into evidence pertaining to the existence or non-existence of the 
manufacturer's warranty, the trial court found, as a matter of law, that Holmes had no 
cause of action against American States for the alleged wrongful denial of warranty 
work. (R. 727-28. 765-69, 894). Holmes' complaint should have been leveled against 
other entities that are not parties to this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A trial court correctly grants a motion for summary judgment when based on 
the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
American Towers Owners Assoc. Inc., v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 
1996). The material facts pertinent to the motions filed by American States were 
undisputed. In his complaint and through the various pleadings and hearings, Holmes 
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alleged that American States failed to obtain a branded title on the Hummer vehicle after 
it took possession of the same from its insured in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-la-1001 and 41-la-1005(l)(a)(i) (1996). Therefore, Holmes alleged that American 
States was liable in damages to Holmes by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-l 005(2) 
and 41-3-702(3)(c) (1996). See (R. 5, 509, 696-699, 894). Holmes wholly failed to 
establish a right to recovery pursuant to the above referenced statutes. 
Holmes was unable to show that American States was a "dealer" as 
contemplated by the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act. He was unable to 
show that American States "fraudulently certified" that the Hummer was entitled to an 
'unbranded' title when it was not. Finally, under the undisputed facts of this case, 
American States owed no duty to Holmes. The trial court's legal determination 
regarding this cause of action should be affirmed. 
In addition, Holmes alleged that American States was liable in damages to 
Holmes because it allegedly "knowingly and intentionally" performed a deceptive and 
unconscionable act or practice as defined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-4 and 13-11-5 
(1996). (R. 6, 512). In further support of his cause of action, Holmes alleged that Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-313 (1996) pertaining to express warranties between a seller and 
buyer was applicable. (R. 6, 513-515, 715). Holmes once again failed to establish a 
right to recovery in accordance with the above-referenced statutes. American States is 
neither a "seller" nor a "supplier" as contemplated by the above-referenced statutes. The 
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trial court correctly dismissed Holmes' cause of action as it related to the Utah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Holmes alleged that American States breached its "fiduciary duties" to 
Holmes. (R. 7, 587). Although never pled, Holmes also argued that he was improperly 
denied warranty work on the Hummer vehicle after his purchase. (Tr. of Hearing pp. 33-
38, attached as Addendum to PL's opening brief). With respect to Holmes' breach of 
fiduciary claim, the undisputed facts clearly showed that American States and Holmes 
had no relationship with one another, let alone a "fiduciary relationship." The trial court 
correctly dismissed Holmes' cause of action against American States based on the breach 
of a fiduciary duty. With respect to Holmes' claim that he was improperly denied 
warranty work on the vehicle after he purchased the same, the trial court correctly 
determined that Holmes' complaint should have been leveled against other persons and 
entities that are not parties to this case. (R. 894). 
Finally, Holmes alleged that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion for a continuance made pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Through the nine months of discovery, American States provided 
Holmes with all documentation pertaining to the chain of sale on the Hummer vehicle. 
American States provided Holmes with all documentation regarding how the adjustment 
of loss was determined with its insured. The trial court reviewed this discovery and 
determined that the additional discovery requested by Holmes would not have addressed 
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the legal issues raised by American States' Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holmes' request for a continuance where the 
requested additional discovery would have been unnecessary. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
HOLMES FAILED TO SHOW A RIGHT TO RECOVERY 
PURSUANT TO THE UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER 
ACT. 
Throughout the proceedings of this case Holmes has repeatedly asserted that 
his right to recovery as against American States arises from American States' omission in 
not having the title to the Hummer vehicle "branded" when American States took 
possession of such from its insured. Therefore, according to Holmes, he is entitled to the 
civil remedies made available pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-702(3)(c) (1996). 
That section indicates that the following is a civil violation: "fraudulently certifying that 
a damaged motor vehicle is entitled to an unbranded title, as defined in 41-1 a-1001, 
when it is not." As a matter of law, the civil remedies found in § 41-3-702(3)(c) are not 
available to Holmes as against American States. 
It has been undisputed throughout this case that American States is not a 
"dealer" of motor vehicles as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-3-102, 41-3-103 
and 41-3-201 (1996). Indeed, § 41-3-103 expressly provides that "[a]n insurance 
company . . . coming into possession of a motor vehicle as an incident to its regular 
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business, that sells the motor vehicle under contractual rights that it may have in the 
motor vehicle is not considered a dealer." Chapter 3 of Title 41 is known as the Motor 
Vehicle Business Regulation Act. This Act applies to the regulation of businesses whose 
operations are closely tied with the sale and disposal of motor vehicles. For example, 
"dealers," "body shops," "dismantles" and "crushers" are governed by the Act. The 
civil penalties made available to a "purchaser" as found in chapter 3 section 702(3) of the 
Act may be available as against one of the above-referenced entities. However, an 
insurance company is not regulated by this Act. Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-102 (1999). 
Because Holmes has no right of recovery as against an insurer under the plain language 
of the Act, his claim that he is entitled to the civil remedies provided for in § 41-3-702(c) 
fail as a matter of law. The trial court correctly dismissed Holmes' claim as against 
American States based upon its omission in not having the title to the Hummer "branded" 
upon taking possession of such. 
Even if Holmes' claim that he is entitled to the civil remedies provided for in 
§41-3-701(3) represents a tenable position, the trial court nevertheless correctly 
dismissed Holmes' cause of action. The only way in which Holmes could recover for 
American States' alleged omission in not procuring a branded title for the subject vehicle 
was to establish that American States fraudulently certified that the subject vehicle was 
entitled to an unbranded title. Holmes recognized this principal in the briefing on the 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 510-511). 
14 
Holmes completely failed to show any facts to the trial court giving rise to an 
inference that American States knowingly engaged in a misrepresentation with the intent 
to deceive and or induce reliance thereon. See Gold Standard, 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 
(Utah 1996). Facts giving rise to an inference of fraud at the summary judgment stage 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. 
Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (Utah App. 1994). As evidenced from Holmes' 
complaint and his continued reliance on the related statutes, he has known from the 
inception of this case the elements that must be established prior to a finding of any 
potential liability on the part of American States under § 41-3-702 and § 41-la-1001. 
Plaintiffs own deposition testimony supports the fact that American States 
never knowingly misrepresented a fact with the intent to induce reliance thereon: 
As a result of having taken the Hummer to the dealership for 
warranty repairs and finding out that this vehicle had been 
scrapped, I was told by the dealership who insured the vehicle. I, 
in turn called them, American States Insurance, and spoke with 
Paula. I do not recall her last name. I had indicated to her what I 
have told you here, and that is I bought a vehicle and I've come to 
find now by taking this vehicle into a dealership for warranty work 
that not only is the warranty invalid but that this vehicle was 
scrapped. What about this? Her response to me was Oh no. That 
was the end of her answer, "Oh, no," in about that tone of voice. 
* * * 
And we discussed further about the problem of what this meant to 
me as a buyer of a vehicle; that I have a vehicle that has no 
warranty; that if, in fact, this vehicle was scrapped, then someone 
did not identify the title or the vehicle as a salvage vehicle. And 
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she said well, we — let me get this — I'm being as close as I can to 
my recollection here. But her comment to me at that point was, 
"We should have handled that. I left it up to Charles Fullmer." 
* * * 
[B]ut someone had towed this vehicle to Charlie Fullmer's 
Economy Auto place of business and that she was going to talk to 
these people and find out why this thing had not been salvaged 
titled. She did say that she had failed to do that and should have 
done it but had left it up to these other people. 
(R. 506-07, 518-22). 
Therefore, Holmes testified that Paula Fisher, claims representative for 
American States, specifically told Holmes that she mistakenly thought Intermountain 
Tow and/or Economy Auto would handle the title certification in accordance with legal 
requirements. No where is there any indication of an knowing misrepresentation and/or 
an intent to deceive or induce reliance.2 Such testimony does not support a finding of 
liability on the part of American States for fraudulently certifying the title of the subject 
vehicle as unbranded. As set forth in § 41-3-702, such a finding must be a condition 
precedent to any liability on the part of American States. 
This case is remarkable, therefore, in that Holmes seeks to hold American 
States liable to him for damage where American States and Holmes and absolutely no 
2
 Likewise, none of these facts show the existence of recklessness. Reckless 
misconduct results when a person, with no intent to cause harm [or deceive] performs an 
act so unreasonable that he or she knows that it is highly probable that harm will result 
See Matheson v. Pearson. 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980). 
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dealings or relationship with one another pertaining to the Hummer vehicle. The only 
representation ever made to Holmes prior to his purchase of the Hummer involved the 
following: 
I called [the American States representative] on the phone and I asked 
her if they were going to sell the vehicle. And she said, we don't 
know what we're going to do with the vehicle. And that was the end 
of the conversation. We never spoke again. 
(R. 581). 
The undisputed facts presented to the trial court clearly showed that prior to 
the above-referenced conversation, Holmes had examined and photographed the 
Hummer while it was stored at Carleson. (R. 183, 579-580). After American States 
delivered the vehicle to Economy Auto, Holmes again inspected the vehicle and made an 
offer on the same to Economy Auto's principal, Charles Fullmer. (R. 582). After that 
offer was rejected, Holmes continued to follow the vehicle through the chain until he 
ultimately purchased the same at the auto auction from Hillcrest Services. (R. 583-85). 
Holmes admitted that he performed research on the vehicle. (R. 584). Holmes admitted 
that the vehicle was in the same condition when he purchased it from Hillcrest as when 
he first inspected the Hummer at Carleson. Holmes admitted that he knew that he 
purchased the vehicle "as is." Holmes admitted that he owns approximately 40-50 
vehicles that he has purchased and/or restored for use in his movie production business. 
(R. 585). As the trial court correctly noted in it ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment "it appears that the plaintiff may have buyer's remorse in this matter." (Tr. 
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Hearing p. 33 attached to Appellant's Addendum in opening brief). Holmes "was not at 
any time misled or misrepresented to, there was no fraud, he never relied on anything as 
far as statements, or on the branded or unbranded title." (Id,). 
Holmes alleged liability on the part of American States pursuant to statutes 
which on their face give no remedy to Holmes as against American States. Holmes 
attempts to bootstrap liability by merging § 41-1 a-1005 with §41-3-702(3)(c) which only 
applies to "dealers." Under the undisputed facts, American States owed no duty to 
Holmes. The statutes relied upon by Holmes from the inception of this case involve two 
different statutory schemes involving different entities. The trial court correctly 
dismissed Holmes' cause of action as against American States based on alleged 
violations of the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
HOLMES FAILED TO SHOW A RIGHT TO RECOVERY 
PURSUANT TO THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES 
PRACTICES ACT. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law for this Court to decide. 
Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asav, 932 P.2d 592 (Utah 1997). When interpreting a statute this 
Court must look at its plain meaning. Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 961, 965 
(Utah 1996). Holmes' claimed right of recovery as against American States pursuant to 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act as found in Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (1996) is 
fallacious. The trial court properly dismissed this cause of action. 
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Section 13-1 l-3(c) of the Utah Code Ann. defines a ''supplier" as a "seller, 
lessor, assignor, offeror, broker or other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or 
enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer." 
Section 13-11-5 of the Utah Code Ann. prohibits certain sales practices of a "supplier." 
Section 13-11-19 of the Utah Code Ann. enables an consumer to bring a cause of action 
against such a "supplier" so long as the consumer suffers loss because of a violation 
found in § 13-11-5. 
As discussed above, however, it has been undisputed throughout this case that 
American States is not a "dealer" of motor vehicles as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 41-3-102, 41-3-103 and 41-3-201 (1996). American States, as an insurance 
company, obviously does not regularly contract for the sale of automobiles to consumers. 
Pursuant to a plain reading of § 13-11-3, the only way in which American States may be 
liable to Holmes pursuant to the Consumer Sales Practices Act is if American States is a 
"supplier" of as defined by the Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-3(6), 13-11-4 (1996). 
That is, plaintiff must establish that American States "regularly solicits, engages in, or 
enforces consumer transactions" like the one involved in this case. Such is clearly not 
the case where American States is not in the business of buying or selling motor vehicles 
and certainly does not regularly solicit or engage in such practices. 
American States does not meet this statutory definition and the trial court 
correctly determined such. (R. 646). Holmes failed to offer any material facts to the 
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contrary. Consequently, American States is not, by definition, an entity who "regularly 
solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions" like the one at issue in this case. 
Despite Holmes' repeated assertions in the opening brief that this Court should construe 
the Consumer Sales Practices Act liberally, Holmes may not establish liability in 
American States where by definition, none exists. This Court should affirm the trial 
court's order on this point. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM. 
The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by 
the court. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993); CT v. Martinez. 845 P.2d 
246, 247 (Utah 1992). It is fundamental law that for a fiduciary duty to exist, there must 
be a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Microbiological Research Corp. v. 
Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 695 (Utah 1981). Under Utah law, a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship will be found only "when one party, having gained the trust and confidence 
of another, exercises extraordinary influence over the other party." Gold Standard, Inc. v. 
Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Utah 1996), (quoting Van Hake v. Thomas. 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985)). Furthermore, when the parties deal "at arm's length" or in 
an adversarial relationship, no fiduciary relationship can be said to exist. Gold Standard, 
915P.2datl064. 
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In this case, the undisputed facts showed that American States did not sell the 
subject vehicle to Holmes. The undisputed facts do not even establish an "arm's length" 
transaction. Indeed, no transaction occurred between Holmes and American States. The 
only "relationship" the parties had prior to Holmes' purchase of the vehicle was the 
single phone call to Paula Fisher at American States wherein plaintiff asked whether 
American States planned on selling the vehicle. (R. 581). As a matter of law, no 
fiduciary relationship existed between Holmes and American States. As such, no duty 
existed between Holmes and American States. American States could not have breached 
a non-existent duty. The trial court correctly dismissed this cause of action and this 
Court should affirm such. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S UNPLED CLAIM THAT HE WAS WRONGLY 
DENIED WARRANTY WORK ON THE SUBJECT HUMMER. 
It is well-established Utah law that a defendant is entitled to summary 
judgment when a plaintiff cannot establish a basis for recovery regardless of how the 
facts are resolved. Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 n.7 (Utah App. 1994)(citing 
Abdulkadir v. Western Pac. R.R.. 318 P.2d 339, 341 (Utah 1957)). Though not 
mentioned in his Complaint, Holmes claims that when he attempted to have warranty 
work done on the Hummer by Carleson Cadillac, he was forced to pay for the work to the 
vehicle and was told that the Hummer's warranty was no longer in effect after the 
accident. (R. 1-10, 713). Although such a claim goes more to Holmes' alleged 
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damages, if any, the trial court determined at the hearing on American States' Motion for 
Summary Judgment that uthe only thing that I leave in this case is that question of 
whether the plaintiffs entitled to warranty work on that automobile." (Tr. of Hr'g on 
Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 35 lines 7-15, attached to appellant's brief addendum). 
Therefore, after the trial court granted American States' partial summary judgment, the 
only issue involved was whether American States' acts or omissions led to Holmes' 
alleged wrongful denial of warranty work on the Hummer vehicle. (Id. at lines 16-19). 
In subsequent briefing, American States moved for summary judgment on this 
issue. American General, the manufacturer of the vehicle established that the Hummer's 
warranty was in full effect throughout the entire manufacturer warranty period. (R. 730-
32, 778-79, 895). American General established that the Hummer's manufacturer 
warranty was not voided when the vehicle was involved in an accident, and that the 
warranty expired only at the end of the warranty period on its own terms. (R. 730-32, 
778-79, 895). In addition, Carleson Cadillac established that any notation on the 
dealership's computers or invoices that the Hummer had been 'scrapped' or that the 
warranty was void, was in error and was not an official act of the dealership or the 
manufacturer. (R. 662) The trial court found, as a matter of law, that Holmes' affidavit 
from Christopher Haderlie that the Hummer's warranty was voided was hearsay and even 
if contradictory, it did not establish a cause of action against American States. (R. 871, 
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894). The trial court had already determined that the alleged statutory causes of action of 
Holmes against American States should be dismissed. 
It was undisputed that Holmes was been denied warranty work when he took 
the Hummer into Carleson Cadillac for repairs. However, that denial was not caused by 
American States. The trial court correctly determined that Holmes' complaints as to the 
denial of the warranty work should have been leveled against other entities not parties to 
this appeal such as, for example, Carleson Cadillac or AM General. (R. 871-72). This 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on this point. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
AMERICAN STATES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS TO HOLMES5 U.C.C. CLAIM. 
Because no contract, bargain or agreement for the sale of the Hummer ever 
existed between American States and Holmes, the trial court correctly granted American 
States' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Holmes' U.C.C. claims. Throughout this 
case Holmes has argued that he is entitled to recover alleged damages from American 
States because the U.C.C. provides a buyer certain remedies for a seller's alleged breach 
of an express warranty made during the bargaining process for the sale of a good. Article 
two of the U.C.C. presupposes the existence of a contract or bargain. The U.C.C. 
provides that: 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
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(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of 
the bargain . . . 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of 
the bargain . . . 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain . . . 
U.C.A. §70A-2-313(1999). 
Utah courts have held that the express warranties provided for in the U.C.C. 
must involve a merchant who contracted for the sale of goods. See Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Kasler Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1560, 1564-65 (D. Utah 1994); State v. GAF Corp.. 760 
P.2d 310, 314-15 (Utah 1988); Utah Co-op. Ass'n. v. Egbert-Haderlie Hog Farms. Inc.. 
550 P.2d 196 (Utah 1976). 
The U.C.C. provides that: 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" 
and "agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future 
sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of 
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A "sale" consists 
in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 
70A-2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is accomplished by 
the making of the contract. 
U.C.A. § 70A-2-106(1) (1998); see also Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax 
Comm'n.. 170 P.2d 164 (1946). By the U.C.C.'s own temis, if a contract or bargain does 
not exist between the parties, the U.C.C. does not apply as a matter of law. See Salt Lake 
City Corp.. 855 F. Supp. at 1564-65 (D. Utah 1994). 
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In this case, the undisputed facts show that American States is not a 
'merchant' in relation to the sale of vehicles, that there was never any type of contract 
between American States and Holmes, and that no 'sale' occurred between American 
States and Holmes. (R. 581, 647). American States is not authorized under Utah law to 
contract for the sale of vehicles to consumers, and is not considered an automobile dealer 
in Utah. See U.C.A. § 41-3-205, 210, 404 (1998). As such, American States is not an 
entity that "deals" in vehicles. See U.C.A. § 70A-2-104(1) 1998). 
The undisputed facts show that at no time did a contract exist between 
American States and Holmes. The undisputed facts show that American States never 
made a promise or representation regarding the status of the Hummer's title or any other 
aspect of the vehicle to Holmes. (R. 581, 647). Accordingly, no "contract for the sale of 
goods" ever existed between American States and Holmes. (R. 581, 647). The trial 
court correctly granted American States' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Holmes 
U.C.C. claim. See U.C.A. § 70A-2-313 (1998). 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT PROPERLY DENIED HOLMES' RULE 56(F) MOTION. 
Because additional discovery would have been irrelevant to the legal issues 
raised by American States' Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court properly 
denied Holmes' Rule 56(f) Motion. An appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a 
Rule 56(f) Motion for abuse of discretion. See Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 
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1243 (Utah 1994); Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Under this standard an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision unless the 
decision exceeds the limits ofreasonability. See Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 930 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). As interpreted by Utah courts, Rule 56(f) provides that a party 
opposing summary judgment may submit an affidavit stating the reasons why he is 
unable to present evidentiary affidavits essential to support his opposition to summary 
judgment. See Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). One commentator has 
stated that: 
The mere averment of exclusive knowledge or control of the facts 
by the moving party is not adequate: the opposing party must show 
to the best of his ability what facts are within the movant's 
exclusive knowledge or control; what steps have been taken to 
obtain the desired information pursuant to discovery procedures 
under the Rules; and that he is desirous of taking advantage of 
these discovery procedures. 
Id. (quoting 2 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice f 56.24 (2d 
ed. 1987)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated several factors to consider under 
Rule 56(f). See Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984). These include: 
1) Were the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit 
"adequate" or is the party against whom summary judgment is 
sought merely on a "fishing expedition" for purely speculative 
facts after substantial discovery has been conducted without 
producing any significant evidence; 2) Was there sufficient time 
since the inception of the lawsuit for the party against whom the 
summary judgment is sought to use discovery procedures, and 
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thereby cross-examine the moving party; 3) If the discovery 
procedures were timely initiated, was the non-moving party 
afforded an appropriate response? 
Id at 312-14. 
This Court has recognized that the party seeking the continuance must 
"explain how the continuance will aid his opposition to summary judgment." Callioux, 
745 P.2d at 841 (quoting Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 
833 (10th Cir. 1986)). This explanation "must present facts in proper form . . . And the 
opposing party's facts must be material and of a substantial nature." Callioux, 745 P.2d 
at 841 (quoting 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice f^ 56.15[3] 
(2d ed. 1987)). In addition, Utah courts have held that where a plaintiffs claims fail as a 
matter of law and where additional discovery would only seek irrelevant facts a Rule 
56(f) motion should be denied. See Mast, 971 P.2d at 934; American Towers Owners 
Assoc, v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1996). 
On October 22, 1997, American States filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
arguing that American States did not qualify under the statutes implicated by Holmes' 
statutory and fiduciary claims. (R. 153-55, 586). In response, on October 27, 1997, 
Holmes filed a Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance. (R. 193). In the Motion, Holmes 
stated that: 
It is essential in order for [Holmes] to appropriately evaluate and 
respond to the issues raised by American's Motion that [Holmes] 
be permitted, prior to the preparation and submission of his 
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response, to take the deposition of those individuals central to 
American's decision to declare the motor vehicle that is the subject 
of these proceedings a total loss salvage motor vehicle. It is also 
essential that [Holmes] be allowed to discover all of the facts and 
documents that underlies [sic] American's decision to declare the 
subject vehicle a salvage vehicle by means of such further 
discovery as may be indicated. 
(R. 200). 
However, it is important to note that American States had already provided 
Holmes with all such information pursuant to discovery. The parties conducted 
discovery for approximately nine months. American States provided Holmes with all 
documentation pertaining to how the loss was adjusted by American States with its 
insured. (R. 225-79, 306-46). American States also supplied Holmes with information 
on the chain of sale between American States, Intermountain Tow, Economy, and the 
other dealer entities. (Id.). The court reviewed the motions pertaining to this discovery 
and looked at the issue regarding the chain of title and the documentation showing the 
way in which adjusted and paid for the loss. (R. 893). 
The trial court found that Holmes' motion was not well taken as the additional 
discovery requested by Holmes would not have further addressed the legal issues of 
whether American States qualified under the statutes relied upon by Holmes. (R. 586). 
However, despite the fact that Holmes already had more than three months to conduct 
additional discovery and to respond to American States' motion, the court granted 
Holmes an extension to March 9, 1998 to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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(R. 572-574). Thus, although Holmes' Rule 56(f) Motion was denied, he still had over 
four-and-a-half months in which to obtain supporting affidavits and respond to American 
States' Motion. (R. 572-574). 
Furthermore, the trial court recognized that Holmes' motion failed to establish 
valid reasons why additional discovery was needed to address American States' motion. 
(R. 200-01, 586). Holmes' conclusory request for a continuance failed to explain how 
the additional discovery would relate to the legal issues raised by American States' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 200-01, 586). Instead, Holmes' motion improperly 
requested additional time to discover irrelevant information relating to American States' 
election to 'total' the Hummer and pay its insured pursuant to its policy. (R. 200-01, 
586, 893). This documentation had already been provided. 
Holmes' motion is similar to the motion discussed by this Court in Callioux, 
where the plaintiff moved for a Rule 56(f) continuance in response to the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. See Callioux, 745 P.2d at 839-40. This Court held that 
the plaintiffs' motion contained a "conclusory claim of need for further discovery," and 
that the motion was not accompanied by "reasons why they could not present 'facts 
essential to justify their opposition'" IcLat 841. This Court held that plaintiffs' "motion 
fails to articulate any material area of inquiry they intended to pursue by deposition . . . 
The [plaintiffs'] conclusory assertion that the scheduled depositions were 'expected to 
produce matter essential to resolution of the defendant's motion' smacks of a 'fishing 
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expedition' for purely speculative facts." IdLat 841; see Cox, 678 P.2d at 314. This 
Court further held that "[t]he [plaintiffs] were afforded ample time between April 26 and 
May 13, 1985 [17 days] in which to properly oppose the motion." IcLat 841. 
In this case, where American States' Motion for Summary Judgment dealt 
with the legal question of whether the statutes implicated by Holmes' claims applied to 
American States, the trial court properly denied Holmes' Rule 56(f) Motion. Holmes' 
Motion was a conclusory request for further discovery which was irrelevant to the 
statutory interpretation issues presented by American States Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Holmes had ample time in which to conduct relevant discovery. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it properly denied Holmes' Rule 56(f) Motion for 
Continuance. (R. 572-574). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed Holmes' causes of action. For the 
foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
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ADDENDUM 
Section 
person's license — Display of salesp^i^on 
and dealer licenses — Licensee's pocket card. 
41-3-204. License* — l'rincipal place of business as pre-
requisite — Change of location — Relin-
quishment on loss of pnncipal place of busi-
ness. 
41-3-205. Licenses — Bonds rcquiied — Maximum li-
ability — Action against surety — LobS of 
bond. 
41-3-206. Duration of licenses — Expiration date — 
Renewal. 
41-3-207. New motoi vehicle dealer's license — Change, 
addition, or loss of franchise — Notification 
— Relinquishment of license and relicensing 
as used motor vehicle dealer — Continuance 
in business to dispose of stock. 
41-3-208. Salesperson's license — Relinquishment upon 
loss or change of employment — Notice to 
salesperson — New license required. 
41-3-209. Administrator's findings — Suspension and 
revocation of license. 
41-3-2JO. License holders — Prohibitions. 
Part 3 
Temporary P e r m i t s 
41-3-301. Sale by dealer, sale by auction — Temporary 
permit — Delivery of certificate of title or 
origin — Notice to division. 
41-3-302. Temporary permits — Purchasers of motor 
vehicles — Penalty for use after expiration 
— Sale and rescission. 
41-3 303. Temporary permits — Inspections required be-
fore issuance. 
41-3-304. Temporary permits — Cancellation of dealers' 
authority to issue — Appeal. 
41-3-305. In-transit permits — Limits — Tax provision. 
Part 4 
Disclosure Requirements — Purchaser's Rights 
41-3-401. 
41-3-402. 
41-3-403. 
41-3-404. 
41-3-405. 
41-3-406. 
41-3-407. 
41-3-408. 
41-3-409. 
41-3-409.5. 
41-3-410. 
41-3-411. 
41-3-412. 
41-3-413. 
41-3-414. 
41-3-501. 
Disclosure of financing arrangements relating 
to the sale of motor vehicles. 
Payoff of liens on motor vehicles traded in. 
Dealer noncompliance — Rights of purchaser 
— Penalties. 
Right of action against dealer, salesperson, 
crusher, body shop, or surety on bond. 
Sale of third party warranty or service contract 
— Remission of fee. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Resale of buy back or nonconforming vehicles 
— Disclosure Statements. 
Certificate of title — Brand — Reporting re-
quirements. 
Unbranded certificate of title — Application 
requirements — Recording requirements — 
Recurrence of nonconformities. 
State civil enforcement. 
Private remedy. 
Unfair trade practices. 
Criminal penalties — Nonexclusive. 
Application. 
Part 5 
Special Dealer License Plates 
Special plates — Dealers — Dismantlers — 
Section 
41-3-502. 
41-3-503. 
41-3-504. 
41-3-505. 
41-3-506. 
41-3-507. 
41-3-508. 
41-3-601. 
41-3-602. 
41-3-701. 
41-3-702. 
41-3-703. 
41-3-801. 
41-3-802. 
41-3-803. 
Manufacturers — Remanufacturers — 
Transporters — Restrictions on use. 
Special plates — Permit to use dealer plate to 
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P A R T I 
ADMINISTRATION 
41-3-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the Motor Vehicle Business 
Regulation Act. 1992 
41-3-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administrator'5 means the motor vehicle enforce-
ment administrator. 
(2) "Agent" means a person other than a holder of any 
dealer's or salesperson's license issued under this chapter, 
who for salary, commission, or compensation of any kind, 
negotiates in any way for the sale, purchase, order, or 
exchange of three or more motor vehicles for any other 
person in any 12-month period. 
(3) "Auction" means a dealer engaged in the business of 
auctioning motor vehicles, either owned or consigned, to 
the general public. 
(4) "Board" means the advisory board created in Sec-
tion 41-3-106. 
(5) "Body shop" means a business engaged in rebuild-
ing, restoring, repairing, or painting primarily the body of 
motor vehicles damaged by collision or natural disaster. 
(6) "Commission" means the State Tax Commission. 
(7) "Crusher" means a person who crushes or shreds 
motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, 
Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, to reduce the useable 
materials and metals to a more compact size for recycling. 
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(8) (a) "Dealer" means a person: 
(i) whose business in whole or in part involves 
selling new, used, or new and used motor ve-
hicles; and 
(ii) who Bells, displays for sale, or offers for 
sale or exchange thi ee or more new or used motor 
vehicles in any 12-month period 
(b) "Dealer" includes a representative or consignee 
of any dealer. 
(9) (a) "Dismantled means a person engaged in the 
business of dismantling motor vehicles subject to 
registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Ve-
hicle Act, for the resale of parts or for salvage. 
(b) "Dismantler" includes a person who dismantles 
three or more motor vehicles in any 12-month period. 
(10) "Distributor" means a person who has a franchise 
from a manufacturer of motor vehicles to distribute motor 
vehicles within this state and who in whole or in part sells 
or distributes new motor vehicles to dealers or who 
maintains distributor representatives. 
(11) "Distributor branch" means a branch office simi-
larly maintained by a distributor for the same purposes a 
factory branch is maintained. 
(12) "Distributor representative" means a person and 
each officer and employee of the person engaged as a 
representative of a distributor or distributor branch of 
motor vehicles to make or promote the sale of the distribu-
tor or the distributor branch's jnotor vehicles, or for 
supervising or contacting dealers or prospective dealers of 
the distributor or the distributor branch, 
(13) "Division" means the Motor Vehicle Enforcement 
Division created in Section 41-3-104. 
(14) "Factory branch" means a branch office main-
tained by a person who manufactures or assembles motor 
vehicles for sale to distributors, motor vehicle dealers, or 
who directs or supervises the factory branch's represen-
tatives. 
(15) "Factory representative" means a person and each 
officer and employee of the person engaged as a represen-
tative of a manufacturer of motor vehicles or by a factory 
branch to make or promote the sale of the manufacturer's 
or factory branch's motor vehicles, or for supervising or 
contacting the dealers or prospective dealers of the manu-
facturer or the factory branch. 
(16) "Franchise" means a contract or agreement be-
tween a dealer and a manufacturer of new motor vehicles 
or its distributor or factory branch by which the dealer is 
authorized to sell any specified make or makes of new 
motor vehicles. 
(17) "Manufacturer" means a person engaged in the 
business of constructing or assembling new motor ve-
hicles, ownership of which is customarily transferred by a 
manufacturer's statement or certificate of origin, or a 
person who constructs three or more new motor vehicles 
in any 12-month period. 
(18) "Motorcycle" has the same meaning as defined in 
Section 41-la-102. 
(19) (a) "Motor vehicle" means a vehicle intended pri-
marily for use and operation on the highway that is: 
(i) self propelled; or 
(ii) a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer, 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) mobile homes as defined in Section 41-la-
102; 
(ii) trailers of 750 pounds or less unladen 
weight; and 
(iii) farm tractors and other machines and 
tools used in the production, harvesting, and care 
of farm products. 
(20) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle that 
has never been titled or registered and has been driven 
less than 7,500 miles, unless the motor vehicle is a trailer 
travel trailer, or semitrailer, in which case the mileage 
limit does not apply. 
(21) "Pawnbroker" means a person whose business is to 
lend money on security of personal property deposited 
with him 
(22) "Principal place of business" means a site or loca-
tion in this state: 
(a) devoted exclusively to the business for which 
the dealer, manufacturer, remanufacturer, trans-
porter, dismantler, crusher, or body shop is licensed, 
and businesses incidental to them; 
(b) sufficiently bounded by fence, chain, posts, or 
otherwise marked to definitely indicate the boundary 
and to admit a definite description with space ad-
equate to permit the display of three or more new, or 
new and used, or used motor \ehicles; and 
(c) that includes a permanent enclosed building or 
structure large enough to accommodate the office of 
the establishment and to provide a safe place to keep 
the books and othei records of the business, at which 
the principal poition of the business is conducted and 
the books and records kept and maintained. 
(23) "Remanufacturer" means a peison who recon-
structs used motor vehicles subject to registration under 
Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, to change the 
body style and appearance of the motor vehicle or who 
constructs or assembles motor vehicles from used or new 
and used motor vehicle parts, or who reconstructs, con-
structs, or assembles three oi more motor vehicles in any 
12-montb period. 
(24) "Salesperson" means an individual who for a sal-
ary, commission, or compensation of any kind, is employed 
either directly, indirectly, regularly, or occasionally by any 
new motor vehicle dealer or used motor vehicle dealer to 
sell, purchase, or exchange oi to negotiate for the sale, 
purchase, or exchange of motor vehicles. 
(25) "Semitrailer" has the same meaning as defined in 
Section 41-la-102. 
(26) "Small trailer" means a trailer that has an un-
laden weight of more than 750 pounds, but less than 2,000 
pounds. 
(27) "Special equipment" includes a truck mounted 
crane, cherry picker, material lift, post hole digger, and a 
utility or service body. 
(28) "Special equipment dealer" means a new or new 
and used motor vehicle dealer engaged in the business of 
buying new incomplete motor vehicles with a grosB ve-
hicle weight of 12,000 or more pounds and installing 
special equipment on the incomplete motor vehicle. 
(29) "Trailer" has the same meaning as defined in 
Section 41-la-102. 
(30) "Transporter" means a peison engaged in the 
business of transporting motor vehicles as described in 
Section 41-3-202. 
(31) "Travel trailer" has the same meaning as provided 
in Section 41-la-102. 
(32) "Used motor vehicle" means a vehicle that has 
been titled and registered to a purchaser other than a 
dealer or has been driven 7,500 or more miles, unless the 
vehicle is a trailer, or semitrailer, in which case the 
mileage limit does not apply. 
(33) "Wholesale motor vehicle auction" means a dealer 
primarily engaged in the business of auctioning consigned 
motor vehicles to dealers or dismantlers who are licensed 
by this or any other jurisdiction 10&8 
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41-3-103. Except ions to "dealer" definition — Denier 
l icensed in other state. 
Under this chapter: 
(1) (a) An insurance compnin. bank, finance company, 
public utility company, commission impound \jird. 
federal or state governmental agency, or nn\ political 
subdivision of any of them or tiny other person coming 
into possession of a motor vehicle t\< an incident tu its 
regulai business, that sells the motor vehicle under 
contractual rights that it nun have in the motor 
vehicle is not considered a dealer. 
(bt A person who sells or exchanges only those 
motor vehicles that he has owned foi over 12 months 
is not consideied a dealer. 
(2) (a) A person engaged in leaning motor vehicles is 
not considered as coming into possession of the motor 
vehicles incident to his regular business; and 
(b) a pawnbroker engaged in selling, exchanging, 
or pawning motor vehicles is not considered as com-
ing into possession of the motor vehicles incident to 
his regular business. 
<3) A peison cim entry licensed us n dealei oi salesper-
son by another state or country and not cunently under 
license suspension or revocation by the administrator 
may only sell motor vehicles in this state to licensed 
dealers, dismantleis. or manufnctuicis. and onl\ at their 
places of business. imi2 
41-3-104. Divis ion creation — Administrator ap-
pointed. 
*1> There is created within the commission the Motor 
Vehicle Enforcement Dhision with the powers and duties 
provided in this chapter. 
(2) The division shall be administered by the motor vehicle 
enforcement administrator. 
13) The administrator shall be appointed by the commission 
and is subject to the commission's supervision and direction 
1092 
41-3-105. Administrator's potvers and duties — Admin-
istrator and invest igators to be law enforce-
ment officers. 
(1) The administrator may make rules to carry out the 
purposes of this chapter and Sections 41-la-1001 through 
41-la-1007 according to the procedures and requirements of 
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(2) (a) The administrator may employ clerks, deputies, and 
assistants necessary to discharge the duties under this 
chapter and may designate the duties of those clerks, 
deputies, and assistants. 
(b) The administrator, assistant administrator, and all 
investigators shall be law enforcement officers ceitified by 
peace officer standards and training as requiied bv Sec-
tion 53-13-103. 
(3) (a) The administrator may investigate any suspected or 
alleged violation of: 
(i) this chapter; 
(ii) Title 41, Chapter la , Motor Vehicle Act; 
(iii) any law concerning motor vehicle fraud; or 
(iv) any rule made by the administrator, 
(b) The administrator may bring an action in the name 
of the state against any person to enjoin a violation found 
under Subsection (3Ma). 
(4) (a) The administrator may prescribe forms to be used 
for applications for licenses. 
(b) The administrator may require information from 
the applicant concerning the applicant's fitness to be 
licensed. 
(c) Each application for a license shall contain: 
fi) if the applicant is an individual, the name and 
lesidence address of the applicant and the trade 
name, if any. under which he intends to conduct 
business: 
tii) if the applicant is a partnership, the name and 
residence address of each partner, whethei limited or 
general, and the name under which the partneiship 
laziness will be conducted: 
liiii if the applicant is a corporation, the name of 
the cojpoiation, and the name and residence addiess 
of each ol its piincipal officers and directors: 
i iv i a complete desciiption of the piincipal place of 
business, including: 
(A) the municipality, with the street and num-
ber, if any: 
(Hi if located outside of any municipality, a 
general desciiption so that the location can be 
determined: and 
tCi any other places of business operated and 
maintained by the applicant in conjunction with 
the principal place of business; und 
iv) if the application is foi a new motor vehicle 
dealer's license, the name of each motor vehicle the 
applicant has been enfranchised to sell or exchange, 
the name and address of the manufacturer or dis-
tributor who has enfranchised the applicant, and the 
names and addiesses of the individuals who will act 
as salespersons under authoiity of the license. 
»5i The administrator may adopt a seal with the words 
Motor Vehicle Enforcement Administrator, State of Utah", to 
authenticate the acts of his office. 
t6) tat The administrator may require that the licensee 
erect or post signs or devices on his piincipal place of 
business and anv other sites, equipment, or locations 
operated and maintaiued by the liceusee in conjunction 
with his business. 
(bl The signs or devices shall state the licensee's name, 
principal place of business, type and number of licenses, 
and a m other information that the administrator consid-
ers necessary to identify the licensee. 
fcl The administrator may make rules in accordance 
with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. determining allowable size and shape of 
signs or devices, their lettering and other details, and 
their location. 
17» ta) The administrator shall provide for quarterly meet-
ings of the advisory board and may call special meetings, 
lb) Notices of ail meetings shall be mailed to each 
member at his last-known address not fewer than five 
days prior to the meeting. 
(8» The administrator, the officers and inspectors of the 
division designated bv the commission, and peace officers 
shall: 
laJ make arrests upon view and without warrant for 
any violation committed in their presence of any of the 
provisions of this chapter, or Title 41, Chapter la , Motor 
Vehicle Act; 
(b) when on duty, upon reasonable belief that a motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is being operated in viola-
tion of any provision of Title 41 , Chapter l a . Motor Vehicle 
Act, require the driver of the vehicle to stop, exhibit his 
driver's license and the registration card issued for the 
vehicle and submit to an inspection of the vehicle, the 
license plates, and registration card; 
i c l serve all warrants relating to the enforcement of the 
laws regulating the operation of motor vehicles, trailers, 
and semitrailers: 
Id) investigate traffic accidents and secure testimony of 
witnesses or persons involved; and 
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(e) investigate repoited thefts of motor vehicles, trail-
ers, and semitrailers. 1B98 
41-3-106. Board — Creation and composit ion — Ap-
pointment, terms, compensat ion, and ex-
penses of member's — Meetings — Quorum — 
Powers and duties -— Officers' e lect ion and 
duties — Voting. 
(1) (a) There is created an advisory boaid of five members 
that Bhall assist and advise the administrator in the 
administration and enforcement of this chapter. 
(b) The members shall be appointed by the governor 
from among the licensed motor vehicle manufacturers, 
distributors, factory branch and distributor branch repre-
sentatives, dealers, dismantlers, tiansporters, 
remanufacturers, and body shops. 
(c) (i) Except as required by Subsection (ii), each mem-
ber shall be appointed for a term of four years or until 
his successor is appointed and qualified. 
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsec-
tion (i), the governor shall, at the time of appointment 
or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to en-
sure that the terms of board members are staggered 
so that approximately half of the board is appointed 
every two years. 
(d) Three members of the board shall be selected as 
follows: 
(i) one from new motor vehicle dealers; 
{i\) one from used motor vehicle dealers; and 
(iii) one from manufacturers, transporters, 
dismantlers, crushers, remanufacturers, and body 
shops. 
(e) (i) Members shall receive no compensation or ben-
efits for their services, but may receive per diem and 
expenses incurred in the performance of the mem-
ber's official duties at the rates established by the 
Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 
63A-3-107. 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service. 
(f) A majority of the members of the board constitutes 
a quorum and may act upon and resolve in the name of 
the board any matter, thing, or question referred to it by 
the administrator, or that the board has power to deter-
mine. 
(g) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unex-
pired term. 
(2) (a) The boaid shall on the first day of each July, or as 
soon thereafter as practicable, elect a chair, vice chair, 
secretary, and assistant secretary from among its mem-
bers, who shall each hold office until his successor is 
elected. 
(b) As soon as the board elects its officers, the elected 
secretary shall certify the results of the election to the 
administrator. 
(c) The chair shall preside at all meetings of the board 
and the secretary shall make a record of the proceedings, 
which shall be preserved in the office of the administrator. 
(d) If the chair is absent from any meeting of the board, 
his duties shall be discharged by the vice chair, and if the 
secretary is absent, his duties Bhall be discharged by the 
assistant seci etary. 
(e) All members of the board may vote on any question, 
matter, or tiling that properly comes before it. 1996 
41-3-107. Attorney general — Duty to render opinions 
and to represent or appear for administrator 
or board. 
The attorney general shall: 
(1) represent the administrator, the division, and th* 
board; 
(2) guve opinions on all questions of law relating to th 
interpretation of this chapter or arising out of the admin 
istration of this chapter; and 
(3) appear on behalf of the administrator, the division 
or the board in all actions brought by or against the 
administrator, the division, or board, whether under the 
provisions of this chapter or otherwise.
 190J 
41-<M08. Copies of records and papers —Admissibility 
in evidence. 
Certified copies of all recoi ds and papers prepared in the 
office of the administrator under seal of the administrator are 
admissible in evidence hi any case in the same manner BB the 
original. 1933 
41-#-109, Adjudicative proceedings — Hearings. 
(J.) The commission, the division, the board, and the admin-
istrator shall comply with the procedures and requirements of 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in all 
adjudicative proceedings conducted under the authority of 
this chapter .and Sections 41-la-1001 through 41-la-1008. 
(#) The administrator may request the attendance of the 
board at any hearing, or he may direct that any hearing be 
held before the board. 1992 
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41.3-201. Licenses required — Rest i tut ion — Educa-
t ion. 
(J) As used in this section, "new applicant" means a person 
who is applying for a license that the person has not been 
issued during the previous licensing year. 
(#) A person may not act as any of the following without 
having procuied a license issued by the administrator: a 
dealer, salesperson, manufacturer, transporter, dismantler, 
distributor, factory branch and representative, distributor 
branch and representative, crusher, remanufacturer, and body 
shop. 
(3) A supplemental license shall be secured by a dealer, 
manufacturer, reman ufacturei, transporter, dismantler, 
crusher, or body shop for each additional place of business 
maintained by him. 
(4) A person who has been convicted of any law relating to 
motor vehicle commerce or motor vehicle fraud may not be 
issued a license unless full restitution regarding those convic-
tions has been made. 
(6) (a) Beginning July 1,1999, the division may not issue a 
license to s new applicant for a new or used motor vehicle 
dealer license unless the new applicant completes an 
eight-hour orientation class approved by the division that 
includes education on motor veliicle laws and rules. 
Cb) The approved costs of the Qtieataticm class shall be 
paid by the new applicant. 
(c) The class shall be completed by the new applicant 
and the applicant's partners, corporate officers, bond 
indemnitors, and managers. 
(d) The division shall approve: 
(i) providers of the orientation class; and 
(ii) costs of the orientation class. 1999 
41-3-201.5. Bi okering of a n e w motor veh ic le wi thout a 
l icense prohibited. 
(1) A person, may not, for a fee, commission, or other form 
of compensation, arrange, offer to arrange, or broker a trans-
action involving the sale or lease of more than two new motor 
vehicles in any 12 consecutive month period, unless the person 
is licensed under Subsection 41-3-202(1). 
v*** ivivjiuit v&riiULES 41-3-204 
(2) A person who violates thiB section is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 1997 
41-3-202. Licenses — Classes and scope. 
(1) A new motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee 
to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange new motor vehicles if 
the licensee possesses a franchise fiom the manufacturer 
of the motor vehicle offered for sale, sold, or exchanged by 
the licensee; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(c) operate as a body shop; and 
(d) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(2) A used motor vehicle dealer's license permits the lic-
ensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(b) operate as a body shop; and 
(c) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(3) A new motorcycle and small trailer dealer's license 
permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange new motorcycles or 
small trailers if the licensee possesses a franchise from 
the manufacturer of the motorcycle or small trailer of-
fered for sale, Bold, or exchanged by the licensee; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motorcycles or 
small trailers; and 
(c) dismantle motorcycles or small trailers. 
(A) A used motorcycle and small trailer dealer's license 
permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motorcycles and 
small trailers; and 
(b) dismantle motorcycles or small trailers. 
(5) A salesperson's license permits the licensee to act as a 
motor vehicle salesperson and is valid for employment with 
only one dealer at a time. 
16) (a) A manufacturer's license permits the licensee to 
construct or assemble motor vehicles subject to registra-
tion under Title 41, Chapter la , Motor Vehicle Act, at an 
established place of business and to remanufacture motor 
vehicles. 
(b) Under rules of the division the licensee may issue 
and install vehicle identification numbers on manufac-
tured motor vehicles. 
(c) The licensee may franchise and appoint dealers to 
sell manufactured motor vehicles by notifying the division 
of the franchise or appointment. 
(7) A transporter's license permits the licensee to transport 
or deliver motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, 
Chapter l a , Motor Vehicle Act from a manufacturing, assem-
°»ng, or distributing point or from a dealer, to dealers, 
distributors, or sales agents of a manufacturer or 
^manufacturer, to or from detail or repair shops, end to 
financial institutions or places of storage from points of 
rep088ession. 
(8) A disman tier's license permits the licensee to dismantle 
niotor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter 
*
a
» Motor Vehicle Act, for the purpose of reselling parts or for 
Balvage, or selling dismantled or salvage vehicles to a crusher 
0 r
 other diBmantler. 
.. 19) A distributor or factory branch and distributor branch's 
lcense permits the licensee to sell and distribute new motor 
e
°icles, pai ts , and accessories to their franchised dealers. 
UO) A representative's license, for factory representatives 
•. distributor representatives permits the licensee to contact 
»s authorized dealers for the purpose of making or promoting 
o sale of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories. 
' **) (a) (i) A remanufacturer's license permits the licensee 
to construct, reconstruct, assemble, or reassemble 
motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, 
Chapter l a , Motor Vehicle Act, from used or new 
motor vehicles or parts . 
(ii) Evidence of ownersliip of parts and motor ve-
hicles used in remanufacture shall be available to the 
division upon demand, 
(b) Under rules of the administi ator, the licensee may 
issue and install vehicle identification numbers on 
remanufactuied motor vehicles. 
(12) A crusher'8 license permits the licensee to engage in 
the business of crushing or shredding motor vehicles subject to 
registration under Title 41, Chapter la , Motor Vehicle Act, for 
the purpose of reducing the useable materials and metals to a 
more compact size for recycling. 
(13) A body shop'B license permits the licensee to rebuild, 
restore, repair, or paint primarily the body of motor vehicles 
damaged by collision or natural disaster, and to dismantle 
motor vehicles. 
(14) A special equipment dealer's license permits the lic-
ensee to: 
(a) buy incomplete new motor vehicles with a gross 
vehicle weight of 12,000 or more pounds from a new motor 
vehicle dealer and sell the new vehicle with the special 
equipment installed without a franchise from the manu-
facturer; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(c) operate as a body shop; and 
(d) dismantle motor vehicles. 1998 
41-3-203. Licenses — Form — Seal — Custody of sales-
person's l icense — Display of salesperson and 
dealer l icenses — Licensee's pocket card. 
(1) (a) The administrator shall prescribe the form of each 
license and the Beal of his office shall be imprinted on each 
license. 
(b) The license of each salesperson shall be delivered or 
mailed to the dealer employing the salesperson and it 
shall be kept in the custody and control of the dealer and 
conspicuously displayed in the dealer's place of business. 
(c) Each licensee shall display conspicuously his own 
license in his place of business. 
(2) (a) The administrator shall prepare and deliver a 
pocket card, certifying that the person whose name is on 
the card is licensed under this chapter. 
(b) Each salesperson's card shall also contain the name 
and address of the dealer employing him. 
(c) Each salesperson shall on request display his pocket 
card. 1992 
41-3-204. Licenses — Principal place of business as 
prerequisite — Change of location — Relin-
quishment on loss of principal place of busi-
ness. 
(1) (a) The following licensees must maintain a principal 
place of business: dealers, Bpecial equipment dealers, 
manufacturers, transporters, remanufacturers, 
dismantlers, crushers, and body shops. 
(b) The administrator may not issue a license under 
Subsection (IKa) to an applicant who does not have a 
principal place of business. 
(c) If a licensee changes the location of his principal 
place of business, he shall immediately notify the admin-
istrator and a new license shall be granted for the 
unexpired portion of the term of the original license at no 
additional fee. 
(2) (a) If a licensee loses possession of a principal place of 
business, the license is automatically suspended and he 
shall immediately notify the administrator and upon 
demand by the administrator deliver the license, pocket 
cards, special plates, and temporary permits to the ad-
ministrator. 
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Part 7 
Remedies 
Section 
70A-2-701. Remedies for breach of collateral contracts not 
impaired. 
70A-2-702. SCWCTV Temed\t;s cm d\sto\ cry uf hu\ ev V insol-
vency. 
70A-2-703. Sellers remedies in general. 
70A-2-704. Sellrr's right to identify Roods to the contract 
notwithstanding bieach or to salvage unfin-
ished goods. 
70A-2-705. Seller's stoppage of delivery in transit or oth-
erwise. 
70A-2-706. Seller's resale including contiact for resale — 
Notice requirements. 
70A-2-707. "Person in the position of a seller." 
70A-2-708. Seller's damages for nonacceptance or repudia-
tion. 
70A-2-709. Action for the price. 
70A-2-710. Seller's incidental damages. 
70A-2-711. • Buyers remedies in general — Buyer's secu-
rity interest in i ejected goods. 
70A-2-712. "Cover" — Buyer's procurement of substitute 
goods. 
70A-2-713. Buyer's damages for nondelivery or repudia-
tion. 
70A-2-714. Buyer's damages for bleach in regard to ac-
cepted goods. 
70A-2-715. Buyer's incidental and consequential damages. 
70A-2-716. Buyer's right to specific performance or re-
plevin. 
70A-2-717. Deduction of damages from the price. 
70A-2-718. Liquidation or limitation of damages — Depos-
its. 
70A-2-719. Contractual modification or limitation of rem-
edy. 
70A-2-720. Effect of "cancellation" or "rescission" on claims 
for antecedent breach. 
70A-2-721. Remedies for fraud. 
70A-2-722. Who can sue third parlies I'm injury to goods. 
70A-2-723. Proof of market price — Time and place. 
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Part 8 
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70A-2-801. Title. 
70A-2-802. Derinitions. 
70A-2-803. Warranties. 
70A-2-804. Nonconforming assistive technology — Rem-
edies. 
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ogy — Prohibition. 
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PART I 
SHORT TITLE, GENERAL CONSTRUCTION AND 
SUBJECT MATTER 
70A-2-101. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be filed as Uniform 
Commercial Code — Sales. imss 
70A-2-I02. Scope — Certain security and other t 
actions excluded from this chapter. r , l n «-
Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter « 
to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any trarm . • 
which although in the form of an unconditional contract i*"' ^ 
or present sale is intended to operate only as a a .*• 
Kpecilh-ci 
it*:-, 
transaction nor does this chaptei impair or repeal any MI ^ 
regulating sales to consumers, fanners or other * V 
classes of btijers. 
70A-2-103. Definitions and index of definitions, 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise require. 
(ai "Bu\er" means a person who buys or contiacL- i 
bu> goods " 
tb) "Good faith" in the case of a met chant mi" 
honesty in fact and the obseivance of reasonable cow in 
cial s tandaids of fair dealing in the trade. 
(c) "Receipt" of goods means taking physical possession 
of them. 
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts t 
sell goods. 
(2» Other definitions applvmg to this chapter or to specified 
parts thetcof, and the sections in which they appear are: 
"Acceptance." Section 70A-2-606. 
"Banker's credit " Section 70A-2-.T25. 
'Between merchants " Section 70A-2-104. 
"Cancellation." Subsection 7()A-2-H)6f4). 
""Commercial unit."' Section 70A-2-105. 
•Continued credit /Sect ion 70A-2-325. 
"Conforming to contract." Section 70A-2-106. 
"Contract for .sale/'Section 70A-2-106. 
"Cover." Section 70A-2-712. 
^Entrusting* Section 70A-2-4D3. 
"Financing agency." Section 7UA-2-I04. 
•"Future goods." Section 70A-2-105. 
"Goods." Section 70A-2-105. 
"Identification/' Section 70A-2-J101. 
"Installment contract." Section 70A-2-612. 
"Letter of Credit " Section 70A-2-U25. 
"Lot." Section 70A-2-10.pj. 
"Merchant." Section 70A-2-104. 
-Overseas " Section 70A-2-323. 
"Person in position of seller." Section 7UA-2-707. 
"Present sale.'' Section 70A-2-106. 
'Sale." Section 70A-2-106. 
"Sale on approval." Section 70A-2-326. 
"Sale or return." Section 70A-2-U26. 
"Termination." Section 70A-2-106 
i'i) The following definitions in other chapters apply to this 
chapter: 
"Check." Section 70A-3-104. 
"'Consignee." Section 70A-7-102. 
"Consignor." Seel ion 70A-7-102. 
"Consumer goods." Section 70A-J-M09. 
-Dishonor." Section 7uA-M-o()2. 
"Drnll "Section 7()A-.T1()4. 
»4> In addition Chapter 1 contains general definitions and 
principles of construction and interpretation applicable 
throughout thi* chapter i»9? 
70A-2-104. Definitions -— "Merchant" — "Between mer-
chants" — "Financing agency." 
M» "Mertlitinl" means a peisnn who deals in goods of the 
kind or otherwise1 In his occupation holds himself out as 
having knowledge or skill peculiar lo the piactices or goods 
imohed in the transaction o» to whom such knowledge or skill 
may be al lnbuled by his employment of an agent ot biokeror 
othei inUrmediarv who b\ his occupation holds himself out as 
having such knowledge oi skill. 
*U/\-,£-2Ul 
(2) "Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or 
other person who in the ordinary course of business makes 
advances against goods or documents of title or who by 
arrangement with either the seller or the buyer intervenes in 
ordinary course to make or collect payment due or claimed 
under the contract for sale, as by purchasing or paying the 
seller's draft or making advances against it or by merely 
taking it for collection whether or not documents of title 
accompany the draft. "Financing agency*' includes also a bank 
or other person who similarly intervenes between persons who 
are in the position of seller and buyer in respect to the goods 
(Section 70A-2-707). 
(3) "Between merchants" means in any transaction with 
respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowl-
edge or skill of merchants. 1965 
70A-2-105. Definitions — Transferability — "Goods" — 
"Future" goods — "Lot" — "Commercial unit." 
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufac-
tured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to 
the contract for sale other than the money in which the price 
is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 8) and things in 
action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and 
growing crops and other identified things attached to realty 
(Section 70A-2-107). 
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any 
interest in them can pass. Goods which are not both existing 
and identified are "future" goods. A purported present sale of 
future goods or of any interest therein operates as a contract 
to sell. 
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing 
identified goods. 
(4) An undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible 
goods is sufficiently identified to be sold although the quantity 
of the bulk is not determined. Any agreed proportion of such a 
bulk or any quantity thereof agreed upon by number, weight 
or other measure may to the extent of the seller's interest in 
the bulk be sold to the buyer who then becomes an owner in 
common. 
(5) "Lot" means a parcel or a single article which is the 
subject matter of a separate sale or delivery, whether or not it 
is sufficient to perform the contract. 
(6) "Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by 
commercial usage is a single whole for purposes of sale and 
division of which materially impairs its character or value on 
the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article 
(aB a machine) or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an 
assortment of sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) 
or any other unit treated in use or in the relevant market as a 
single whole. 1965 
70A-2-106. Definit ions — "Contract" — "Agreement" — 
"Contract for sale" — "Sale" — "Present sale" 
— "Conforming" to contract — "Termination" 
— "Cancellation." 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires 
"contract" and "agreement" are limited to those relating to the 
present or future sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes 
both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a 
future time. A ".sale" consists in the passing of title from the 
seller to the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A ''present 
8ale" means a sale which is accomplished by the making of the 
contract. 
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance 
are "conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in 
accordance with the obligations under the contract. 
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a 
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract 
otherwise than for its breach. On "termination" all obligations 
v»hich are still executory on both sides are discharged but any 
right based on prior breach or performance survives. 
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to 
the contract for breach by the other and its effect is the same 
as that of "termination" except that the canceling party also 
retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any 
unperformed balance. 1965 
70A-2-107. Goods to be severed from realty — Record-
ing. 
(1) A contract for the sale of minerals or the like (including 
oil or gas) or a structure or its materials to be removed from 
realty is a contract for the sale of goods within this chapter if 
they are to be severed by thp seller but until severance a 
purported present sale thereof which is not effective as a 
transfer of an interest in land is effective onlv as a contract to 
sell. 
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of growing 
crops or other things attached to realty and capable of sever-
ance without material harm thereto but not described in 
Subsection (1) or of timber to be cut is a contract for the sale 
of goods within this chapter whether the subject matter is to 
be severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it forms 
part of the realty at the time of contracting, and the parties 
can by identification effect a present sale before severance. 
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third-
party rights provided by the law relating to realty records, and 
the contract for sale may be executed and recorded as a 
document transferring an interest in land and shall then 
constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under 
the contract for sale. 1977 
PART 2 
FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF 
CONTRACT 
70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract 
for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some 
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made between the parties and signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or 
broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or 
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not 
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of 
goods shown in such writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writ-
ing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the 
sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to 
know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of Subsection 
(1) against such party unless wiitten notice of objection to its 
contents is given within ten days after it is received. 
13) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of 
Subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforce-
able 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the 
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the 
ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, 
before notice of repudiation is received and under circum-
stances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for 
the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of 
their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; 
or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court 
that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not 
enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of 
goods admitted; or 
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(b) if the seller is authorized to send the goods he may 
ship them under reservation, and may tender the docu-
ments of title, but the buyer may inspect the goods after 
their arrival before payment is due unless such inspection 
is inconsistent with the terms of the contract \Section 
70A-2-513); and 
(c) if delivery is authorized and made by way of docu-
ments of title otherwise than by Subsection (b) then 
payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer 
is to receive the documents regardless of where the goods 
are to be received; and 
(d) where the seller is required or authorized to ship 
the goods on credit the credit period runs from the time of 
shipment but postdating the invoice or delaying its dis-
patch will correspondingly delay the starting of the credit 
period. 1965 
70A-2-311. Options and cooperation respect ing perfor-
mance. 
(1) An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently 
definite (Subsection (3) of Section 70A-2-204) to be a contract 
is not made invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of 
performance to be specified by one of the parties. Any such 
specification must be made in good faith and within limits set 
by commercial reasonableness. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed specifications relating to as-
sortment of the goods are at the buyer's option and except as 
otherwise provided in Subsections (l)(c) and (3) of Section 
70A-2-319 specifications or arrangements relating to ship-
ment are at the seller's option. 
(3) Where such specification would materially affect the 
other party's performance but is not seasonably made or 
where one party's cooperation is necessary to the agreed 
performance of the other but is not seasonably forthcoming, 
the other party in addition to all other remedies 
(a) is excused for any resulting delay in his own perfor-
mance; and 
(b) may also either proceed to perform in any reason-
able manner or after the time for a material part of his 
own performance treat the failure to specify or to cooper-
ate as a breach by failure to deliver or accept the goods. 
1965 
70A-2-312. Warranty of t it le and against infringement 
— Buyer's obligation against infringement. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a 
warranty by the seller that 
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer 
rightful; and 
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security 
interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer 
at the time of contracting has no knowledge. 
(2) A warranty under Subsection (I) will be excluded or 
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which 
give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not 
claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such 
right or title as he or a third person may have. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant 
regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods 
shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person 
by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who htriusht's 
specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless 
against any such claim which arises out of compliance with 
the specifications. i»05 
70A-2-313. E x p r e s s w a r r a n t i e s by aff i rmation, p rom-
ise, de sc r i p t i on , s a m p l e . 
(1) Express warranties by the sellei are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the 
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes 
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express w 
ranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation *' 
promise. o r 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part 
YVre basSs trf iVte b&Tgata t reataa SM «*pic&B warranty th 
the goods shall conform to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the ba * 
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the wlml» 
of the goods shall conform to the sample or model 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express war 
ranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" n 
' 'guarantee* or that he have a specific intention to make 
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the good*? 
or a statement puiporting to be merely the sellers opinion o 
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. [$*& 
70A-2-314. Implied warranty — Merchantability — tj 8 . 
age of trade. 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316) a 
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a 
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect 
to goods of that kind Under this section the serving for value 
of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or 
elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the con-
tract description; and 
(bl in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average 
quality within the description; and 
tcA avo. ftt fo* \kvz w d u w y p u r p l e s , £wr wlrah ^M^VI 
goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agree-
ment, of even kind, quality and quantity within each uni! 
and among all units involved; and 
(o) are adequately contained, packaged, and labulecs as 
the agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made 
on the container or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316) other 
implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage 
of trade. 19D5 
70A-2-315. Implied warranty — Fitness for particular 
purpose. 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to 
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required 
and that the buyer is relying on the seller s skill or judgment 
to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or 
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the 
goods shall be fit for such purpose. 1965 
70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties — 
Livestock. 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit 
v?aTTan\y >V»«\\ be cornAruea wherever reason ab\e as raraY?.-
tent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this 
chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 70A-2-202* 
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such 
construction is unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), to exclude or modify the 
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the 
language must mention merchantability and in case of a 
writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any 
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing 
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties 
of fitness i^ sufficient if it states, for example, tha t "There are 
no w at ranties which extend beyond the description on the face 
heieof.r 
tateroent shall be signed and certified as to its truthfulness 
y the transferor, stating-
(a) the date of transfer; 
(b) the transferor's name and address; 
(c) the transferee's name and address: 
(d) the identity of the motor vehicle, including its 
make, model, year, body type, and identification number; 
(e) the odometer reading at the time of transfer, not 
including tenths of miles or tenths of kilometers; 
(f) (i) that to the best of the transferor's knowledge, 
the odometer reading reflects the amount of miles or 
kilometers the motor vehicle has actualh been 
driven; 
(ii) that the odometer reading reflects the amount 
of miles or kilometers in excess of the designed 
mechanical odometer limit; or 
(iii) that the odometer reading is not the actual 
amount of miles or kilometers; and 
(g) a warning to alert the transferee if a discrepancy 
exists between the odometer reading and the actual 
mileage. 
(3) (a) Each transferee of a motor vehicle shall acknowl-
edge receipt of the odometer disclosure statement re-
quired by Subsection (2) by signing it, and the transferor 
shall deliver to the transferee the original odometer 
disclosure statement Both the transferor and the trans-
feree shall retain a legible copy of the odometer disclosure 
statement for not less than four years. 
(b) A dealer who is required under Section 41-3-301 to 
title and register a motor vehicle sold to a customer shall 
surrender the original odometer disclosure statement to 
the division and deliver a copy to the transferee. 
(4) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, the 
dometer mileage need not be disclosed bv a transferor of: 
\a) a single motor vehicle having a manufacturer speci-
fied gross laden weight rating of more than 16,000 
pounds, or a motor vehicle registered in this state for a 
gross laden weight of 18,000 pounds or more; 
(b) a motor vehicle that is ten years old or older; 
(c) a motor vehicle sold directly by the manufacturer to 
any agency of the United States in conformity with 
contractual specifications; or 
(d) a new motor vehicle prior to its first transfer for 
purposes other than resale. 
(5) If the motor vehicle has not been titled or if the certifi-
ate of title does not contain a space fov the information 
Quired, the written disclosure shall be executed as a sepa-
ate document. 
(6) Aperson may not sign an odometer disclosure statement 
s
 both the transferor and the transferee in the same trans-
ction. 1992 
l-la-903. Leased motor vehicles — Disclosure of 
odometer information. 
U) (a) Before executing any tiansfer of ownership docu-
ment, each lessor of a leased motor vehicle shall notify the 
lessee in writing that the lessee is required to provide a 
Written disclosure to the lessor regarding the mileage. 
(b) This notice shall state tha t failure to complete or 
providing false information may result in fines, imprison-
ment, or both. 
(2) (a) In connection with the transfer of ownership of the 
leased motor vehicle, the lessee shall furnish to the lessor 
a written statement regarding the mileage of the motor 
vehicle. 
(b) This statement must be signed by the lessee and 
shall contain all of the information required by Section 
41-la-902 and in addition the name and address of the 
lessee and the lessor. 
Ic) The statement shall be signed and certified as to its 
truthfulness by the lessee 1902 
41-la-904. Retention of statements by dealers — In-
spection. 
I l l Each dealer required to execute and furnish an odom-
eter mileage disclosure statement under Section 41-la-902 
shall retain at its pi imaiy place of business foi four years after 
each transfer of a motor vehicle each statement that he 
receives and a legible copy of each statement that he issues in 
connection with those transfers. 
(2) These statements shall be available for inspection by, 
and copies shall be furnished to, any peace officer during 
reasonable business hours. 1002 
41-la-905. Division to print mileage on certificate of 
title — Exceptions — Owner to record mileage 
on application. 
H) The division, before accepting an application for trans-
fer of ownership of a motor vehicle under Part 7. Transfer of 
Ownership, shall require the transferee to furnish the com-
pleted odometer disclosure statement required by Section 
4t-la-902 and shall, upon the transfer of ownership, print the 
mileage on the new certificate of title. 
(2) This section does not apply to motor vehicles exempted 
from mileage disclosure statements under Section 41-la-902 
(3) The division, before accepting any application for re-
newal of registration of a motor vehicle, shall require the 
owner to record the actual miles on the application. 1992 
41-la-906. Repair or replacement of odometer — No-
tice affixed to motor vehicle. 
fl) Sections 4l- la-902 through 41-la-905 do not prevent 
the repair or replacement of an odometer, pro\ ided the mile-
age indicated on the odometer remains the same as before the 
repair or replacement. 
(2) Where the odometer is incapable of registering the same 
mileage as before the repair or replacement, the odometer 
shall be adjusted to zero and a notice in writing shall be affixed 
by the owner to the left door frame of the motor vehicle 
specifying the mileage prior to repair or replacement of the 
odometer and the date it was repaired or replaced. 1992 
PART 10 
SALVAGE VEHICLES — JUNK AND DISMANTLED 
VEHICLES 
41-la-1001. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 41-la-1001 through 41-la-1008: 
(1) "Certified vehicle inspector" means a person em-
ployed by the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division as 
qualified through experience, training, or both to identify 
and analyze damage to vehicles with either unibody or 
conventional frames. 
(2) "Major component partr means: 
fa) the front body component of a motor vehicle 
consisting of the structure forward of the firewall; 
(b) the passenger body component of a motor ve-
hicle including the firewall, roof, and extending to 
and including the rear-most seating; 
(c) the rear body component of a motor vehicle 
consisting of the main cross member directly behind 
the rear-most seating excluding any auxiliary seating 
and structural bodv assembly rear of the cross mem-
bers; and 
fd* the frame of a motor vehicle consisting of the 
structural member that supports the auto body. 
(3) la> "Major damage** means damage to a major com-
ponent part of the mnlor vehicle requiring ten or 
more hours to repair or replace, as determined by a 
4Ma-1002 MOTOR VEHICLES 636 
collision estimating guide recognized by the Motor 
Vehicle Enforcement Division. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a) repair or re-
placement hours do not include time spent on cos-
metic repairs. 
(4) "Owner" means the person who has the legal right 
to possession of the vehicle. 
(5) (a) "Salvage certificate" means a certificate of own-
ership issued for a salvage vehicle before a new 
certificate of title is issued for the vehicle. 
(b) A salvage certificate is not valid for registration 
purposes. 
(6) "Salvage vehicle" means any vehicle: 
(a) damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence 
to the extent that the cost of repairing the vehicle for 
safe operation exceeds its fair market value; or 
(b) that has been declared a salvage vehicle by an 
insurer or other state or jurisdiction, but is not 
precluded from further registration and titling. 
(7) "Unbranded title" means a certificate of title for a 
previously damaged motor vehicle without any designa-
tion that the motor vehicle has been damaged. 
(8) "Vehicle damage disclosure statement" means the 
form designed and furnished by the Motor Vehicle En-
forcement Division for a damaged motor vehicle inspec-
tion under Section 41-la-1002. 1994 
41-1 a-1002. Unbranded tit le — Prerepair inspect ions 
— Interim repair inspect ions — Repair. 
(1) To obtain an unbranded title to a salvage vehicle: 
(a) the vehicle must: 
(i) be a motor vehicle; 
(ii) (A) have an unbranded Utah title or a Utah 
salvage certificate issued to replace an un-
branded Utah title a t the time the motor vehicle 
is inspected under Subsection (iii); or 
(B) have an unbranded title from another ju-
risdiction and the motor vehicle shall have been 
damaged in Utah as evidenced by an accident 
report; 
liii) be inspected by a certified vehicle inspector 
prior to any repairs on the motor vehicle following 
any major damage; and 
(iv) have major damage in no more than one major 
component part; 
(b) the major damage identified by a certified vehicle 
inspector under Subsection (a) must be repaired in accor-
dance with standards established by the Motor Vehicle 
Enforcement Division; 
(c) any interim inspection required by a certified ve-
hicle inspector must be completed in accordance with the 
directions of the initial certified vehicle inspector and to 
the satisfaction of the inteiim certified vehicle inspector; 
and 
(d) the owner must apply to the Motor Vehicle Enforce-
ment Division for authorization to obtain an unbranded 
title under Section 41-la-1003. 
(2) A flood damaged motor vehicle does not qualify for an 
unbranded title. 
(3) A salvage vehicle that is seven years old or older at the 
time of application for unbranding does not qualify for an 
unbranded title. 
(4) The prerepair motor vehicle inspection required under 
Subsection (1) shall include examination of the motor vehicle 
and its major component parts to determine: 
(a) the extent and location of the major damage to the 
motor vehicle; 
(b) that the identification numbers of the vehicle or its 
parts have not been removed, falsified, altered, defaced, or 
destroyed; and 
(c) there are no indications that the vehicle or any of J^ 
parts are stolen. 
(5) If the certified vehicle inspector determines in an in. 
spection under Subsection (1) that the motor vehicle has major 
damage: 
(a) in more than one major component part , the certi-
fied vehicle inspector shall notify the Motor Vehicle En-
forcement Division and the owner that the motor vehicle 
does not qualify for an unbranded title; or 
(b) requiring repair or replacement in one or no major 
component part he shall: 
(i) record on the vehicle damage disclosure state-
ment the* 
(A) date of the inspection; 
(B) description of the motor vehicle including 
its vehicle identification number, make, model, 
and year of manufacture; 
(C) owner of the motor vehicle and name of the 
lienholder, if any, shown on the salvage certifi-
cate; and 
(D) major damage to the motor vehicle requir-
ing repair or replacement; 
(ii) indicate that the motor vehicle may qualify for 
an unbranded title if the major damage is repaired or 
the damaged part is replaced; 
(iii) sign the vehicle damage disclosure statement 
and attest to the information's accuracy; 
(iv) indicate whether an interim inspection of the 
motor vehicle damage repairs is required and which 
repairs require inspection prior to completion of re-
pair work; 
(v) give to the owner a copy of the vehicle damage 
disclosure statement and deliver or mail a copv of the 
statement to the lienholder, if any, shown on the 
salvage certificate; and 
(vi) file the original vehicle damage disclosure 
statement with the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Divi-
sion. 
(6) (a) Upon receipt by the Motor Vehicle Enforcement 
Division of notification from a certified vehicle inspector 
that a motor vehicle has had a prerepair inspection, the 
Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division shall make a record 
of the inspection. 
(b) Any subsequent prerepair inspections shall be dis-
regarded by the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division in 
evaluating the major damage to the motor vehicle and the 
repairs required. 
(7) A person who repairs or replaces major damage identi-
fied by a certified vehicle inspector on a motor vehicle in 
accordance with Subsection (1) shall: 
(a) record on the vehicle damage disclosure statement: 
(i) a description of the repairs made to the motor 
vehicle including how they were made; and 
(ii) his signature following the repair description 
with an attestation that the description is accurate; 
(b) obtain the signature of the certified vehicle inspec-
tor who performs an interim inspection, attesting that the 
repairs identified for interim inspection were satisfacto-
rily completed; 
(c) file the original vehicle damage disclosure state-
ment containing the repair information with the Motor 
Vehicle Enforcement Division; and 
(d) give a copy of the vehicle damage disclosure state-
ment to the owner. 1994 
41-la-1003. Unbranded ce r t i f i ca te of title — Applica-
tion. 
(1) If the certified vehicle inspector determines under Sec-
tion 41-1 a-1002 that a motor vehicle may qualify for an 
unbranded title, following repair or replacement of the dam-
aged major component part of the vehicle identified hv the 
certified vehicle inspector the ownei ma> submit an apphca 
tion to the Motoi Vehicle Enforcement Di\ lsion for issuance of 
an unbranded title 
(2) The applicant for an unbranded title shall submit to the 
Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division an application together 
with the vehicle damage disclosure statement and othei 
supporting documents requned by the Motoi Vehicle Eniorce 
ment Division 
(3) The Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division shall make an 
independent determination based on the vehicle damage <hs 
closure statement and other relevant documents whether the 
motor vehicle is qualified to leceive an unbianded title imn 
41-la-1004. Certificate of title — Salvage vehic les . 
(1) If the division is able to asceitam the fact, at the time 
apphcation is made for initial legistiation oi transfer of 
ownership of a salvage vehicle, the title shall be branded 
(a) rebuilt and restored to opeiation, 
(b) m a flood and restored to opeiation, or 
(c) not restored to opeiation 
(2) Befoie the sale of a vehicle for which a salvage certifi-
cate or branded title has been issued the seller shall provide 
the prospective purchaser with written notification that a 
salvage certificate or a branded title has been issued for the 
vehicle i9cu 
41-la-1005. Salvage vehic le — Declaration by insur-
ance company — Surrender of title — Salvage 
certificate of title. 
(1) (a) d) If an insurance company declares a vehicle a 
salvage vehicle and takes possession of the vehicle foi 
disposal, or an insurance company pays off the owner 
of a vehicle that is stolen and not lecovered, the 
insurance company shall within ten days liom the 
settlement of the loss sunendei to the division the 
outstanding certificate of title, piopeily endoised, or 
other evidence of ownership acceptable to the div I-
sion 
(n) The division shall then issue a salvage ceitifi 
cate in the insurance company's name 
(b) d) If the ownei of a salvage vehicle letains posses 
sion of the vehicle, the insurance com pan v shall 
within ten days from the settlement of the loss notify 
the division of the retention on a foim pi escribed by 
the division 
(n) The insurance company shall notif) the ownei 
of the vehicle of his responsibility to comply with this 
section 
(m) The owner shall within ten days fiom the 
settlement of the loss sui lender to the division the 
properly endorsed certificate of title or other evidence 
of ownership acceptable to the di\ ibion 
(w) The division shall then issue a salvage ceitifi 
cate in the owner's name 
(c) d) When a salvage vehicle is not the subject of an 
insurance settlement, a self insurer oi an owner who 
is uninsured shall within ten days of the theft oi 
major damage suirender to the division the pioperly 
endorsed certificate of title or othei evidence of own-
ership acceptable to the division 
(n) The division shall then issue a salvage certifi 
cate in the ownei's name 
(d) d) If a dealer licensed undei Title 41 Chaptei 3, 
Pa i t 2, Licensing takes possession oi any salvage 
vehicle for which theie is not already issued a 
branded title or salvage certificate fiom the division 
or another junsdiction, the dealei shall within ten 
days surrendr»i to the division the coi tificate of title oi 
other evidence of ownership acceptable to the divi 
sion 
hi* The division shall then issue a salvage ceitifi 
cate in the applicants name 
(2) Anv person, insuiance companv or dealer licensed un 
der Title 41, Chapter 3 Part 2, Licensing who fails to obtain 
a salvage certificate as lequired in this section or who sells a 
salvage vehicle without fiist obtaining a salvage ceitificate is 
guilt v of a class B misdemeanoi 
(3) This section does not applv to a vehicle 
(a) that has an undamaged, wholesale value of $2,000 
or less, or 
(bi if a salvage ceitihcate has been issued bv another 
state or jurisdiction loi the salvage vehicle 
H) Upon sale or disposal of a s ilvage vehicle, the seller 
shall dehvei to the puichaser the propeilv endorsed salvage 
certificate within 48 houis as lequned in Section 41 la 1310, 
oi if the sellei is a dealer licensed undei Title 41, Chapter 3, 
Part 2, Licensing, the dealei shall complv with Section 41 3 
301 
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (1) this chapter does 
not applv to a motor vehicle that has been stolen or taken 
without the consent of the owner until the motor vehicle has 
been recovered, and then it applies onlv if the motor vehicle is 
a salvage v ehicle 1992 
41-la-1006. Vehicle damaged out-of-state — Division to 
make a reco id . 
<1) If a vehicle that is titled in this state is damaged in 
another state 01 junsdiction but would require a salvage 
certificate in this state and the vehicle is not returned to the 
state the owner of the v ehicle must notifs the purchasei and 
the division that if the vehicle is subsequently titled in Utah 
the certificate of title will be branded as a salvage vehicle 
(2) The division shall make a 1 ecoid of the damage 1992 
4Ma-1007 . Fee s . 
( D A certified vehicle mspectoi may chaige a fee in accor-
dance with Section 6.3 38 3 2 lor each inspection undei Sub-
section 41 l a 1002(1) 
(2> To covei the costs of inspection and to defiay the cost of 
certification, the fee charged undei this section bv a certified 
vehicle inspectoi shall be letained bv the Motor Vehicle 
Enforcement Div ision as a dedicated ciedit 1995 
41-la-1008. Criminal penalty for violation. 
It is a class A misdemeanoi to knowinglv violate Sections 
41 la-1001 through 41 l a 1007, unless another penalty is 
specifically prov ided 1992 
41-1 a-1009. Abandoned and inoperable vehicles , ves-
sels , and outboard motors — Determination 
by commission — Disposal of vehicles . 
(1» A vehicle, vessel, or outboaid motor is abandoned and 
inopeiable when 
(a) the vehicle vessel or outboaid motor has been 
inspected by an authnnzed investigator 01 agent ap 
pointed by the commission and 
(b) the authorized investigator or agent has made a 
written determination that the vehicle, vessel, 01 out-
board motor cannot he lebuiit or reconstiucted in a 
manner that allows its use a* designed by the manufac-
turer 
'2) la> Befoie issuing a written determination under Sub 
section '1), a signed statement is required fiom the 
purchaser of thp vehicle, vessel, 01 outboard motor for 
salvage, identifying the vehicle vessel, or outboaid motor 
by identification number and certifying that the inopei-
able vehicle vessel 01 outboaid motoi will not be rebuilt, 
reconstructed or m <• nv manner allowed to opeiate as 
designed nv the mnnuiar tuiei 
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thereafter, but no later than 72 hours prior to the execution of 
the contract, it provides to the proprietor, in writing, a 
schedule of the rates and terms of royalties under the contract, 
including: 
(1) any sliding scale, discounts, or reductions in fees on 
any basis for which the proprietor may be eligible; and 
(2) any scheduled increases or decreases in fees duiing 
the term of the contract. 1998 
13-10a-5. Contract requirements . 
(1) Beginning July 1,1998, each contract for the payment of 
royalties between a proprietor and a performing rights society 
or organization executed, issued, or renewed in the state shall: 
(a) be in writing; 
(b) be signed by both parties to the contract; and 
(c) include at least the following information: 
(i) the proprietor's name and business address and 
the name and location of each place of business to 
which the contract applies; 
(ii) the name and business address of the perform-
ing rights society or organization; 
(iii) the duration of the contract; and 
(iv) the schedule of rates and terms of royalties to 
be collected under the contract, including any sliding 
scale, discount, or schedule for any increase or de-
crease of those rates for the duration of the contract. 
(2) (a) Nothing in this act shall be construed to affect any 
contract signed before July 1, 1998. 
(b) All contracts signed before July 1, 1998, that are 
renewed after that date are subject to the requirements of 
this act. 1998 
13-10a-6. Jurisdict ion of court action. 
An action may be brought or a counterclaim may be asserted 
in a court of competent jurisdiction against a performing 
rights society to enjoin a violation of this act and to recover 
actual damages sustained as a result of that violation. 1998 
13-10a-7. Provis ions of chapter not exclusive . 
The remedies, duties, and prohibitions of this chapter are 
not exclusive and aie in addition to all other causes of actions, 
remedies, and penalties provided by law. 1998 
13-10a-S. Exemptions . 
(1) This act does not apply to contracts between performing 
rights societies or organizations and broadcasters licensed by 
the Federal Communications Commission, unless any such 
society is licensed by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. 
(2) This act does not apply to investigations by law enforce-
ment agencies or other persons with respect to suspected 
violations of Subsection 13-10-8(2)(b). 1998 
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13-11-1. Citation of act. 
Tins act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act." 1973 
13-11-2. Construct ion and purposes of act. 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the follow-
ing policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law govern-
ing consumer sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit 
deceptive and unconscionable sales piactices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer 
sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales prac-
tices not inconsistent with the policies of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection: 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administra-
tive rules, with respect to the subject of this act among 
those states which enact similar laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in goo<* faith 
comply with the provisions of this act. 1973 
13-11-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Charitable solicitation" means any request directly 
or indirectly for money, credit, property, financial assis-
tance, or any other thing of value on the plea or represen-
tation that it will be used for a charitable purpose. A 
charitable solicitation may be made in any manner, in-
cluding: 
(a) any oral or written request, including a tele-
phone request; 
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting of any 
handbill, wiitten advertisement, or publication, 
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or requefct of 
donations for any book, card, chance, coupon, device, 
magazine, membership, merchandise, subscription, 
ticket, flower, flag, button, sticker, ribbon, token, 
trinket, tag, souvenir, candy, or any other article in 
connection with which any appeal is made for any 
charitable purpose, or where the name of any chari-
table organization or movement is used or referred to 
as an inducement or reason for making any purchase 
donation, or where, in connection with any sale or 
donation, any statement is made that the whole or 
any part of the proceeds of any sale or donation will 
go to or be donated to any charitable purpose. A 
charitable solicitation is considered complete when 
made, whether or not the mganization or person 
making the solicitation receives any contribution or 
makes any sale. 
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assign-
ment, awaid by chance, or other written or oral transfer 
or disposition of goods, services, or other property, both 
tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), 
to a person for primarily personal, family, or household 
purposes, or for purposes that relate to a business oppor-
tunity that requires both his expenditure of money or 
property and his personal services on a continuing basis 
and in which he has not been previously engaged, or a 
solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect to any of 
these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or 
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of an agree-
ment with respect to any of these transfers or disposi-
tions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this 
section. 
(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division of Con-
sumer Protection. 
(4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any 
supporting opinion, that determines the rights of the 
parties and concerning which appellate remedies have 
been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, govern-
ment, governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, 
estate, trust, partnership, association, cooperative, or any 
other legal entity. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, 
broker, or other person who regularly solicits, engages in, 
or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he 
deals directly with the consumer. 1987 
13-11-4. Decept ive act or practice by supplier. 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection 
with a consumer transaction violates this chapter whether it 
occurs before, during, or after the transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier 
commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly 
or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, 
accessories, uses, or benefits, if it has not; 
<b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
is of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, 
if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
is new, or unused, if it is not, or has been used to an extent 
that is materially different from the fact; 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
is available to the consiuner for a reason that does not 
exist; 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
has been supplied in accordance with a previous repre-
sentation, if it has not; 
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
will be supplied in greater quantity than the supplier 
intends; 
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it 
is not; 
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it 
does not; 
(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, ap-
proval, or affiliation the supplier does not have; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or 
does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, 
particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, or 
obligations, if the representation is false; 
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, 
discount, or other benefit as an inducement for entering 
into a consumer transaction in return for giving the 
supplier the names of prospective consumers or otherwise 
helping the supplier to enter into other consumer trans-
actions, if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event 
occurring after the consumer enters into the transaction; 
(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to 
ship the goods or furnish the services within the time 
advertised or otherwise represented oi, if no specific time 
is advertised or represented, fails to ship the goods or 
furnish the sen ices within 30 days, unless within the 
applicable time period the supplier provides the buyer 
with the option to either cancel the sales agreement and 
receive a refund of all previous payments to the supplier 
or to extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed 
by the supplier, but any refund shall be mailed or deliv-
ered to the buyer within ten business days after the seller 
receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's 
right to cancel the sales agreement and receive the 
refund; 
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to 
cancel a direct solicitation sale within three business days 
of the time of purchase if the sale is made other than at 
the supplier's established place of business pursuant to 
the supplier's mail, telephone, or personal contact and if 
the sale price exceeds $25, unless the supplier's cancella-
tion policy is communicated to the buyer and the policy 
offers greater rights to the buyer than this Subsection 
(2Xm), which notice shall be a conspicuous statement 
written in dark bold at least 12 point tjpe, on the first 
page of the purchase documentation, and shall read as 
follows: TOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CON-
TRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE 
THIRD BUSINESS DAY (or time period reflecting the 
supplier's cancellation policy but not less than three 
business days) AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSAC-
TION OR RECEIPT OF THE PRODUCT, WHICHEVER 
IS LATER."; 
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyra-
mid scheme as defined under Title 76, Chapter 6a, Pyra-
mid Scheme Act; 
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed in 
response to a charitable solicitation will be donated or 
used for a particular purpose or will be donated to or used 
by a particular organization, if the representation is false; 
or 
(p) if a consumer indicates his intention of making a 
claim for a motor vehicle repair against his motor vehicle 
insurance policy: 
(i) commences the repair without first giving the 
consumer oral and written notice of: 
(A) the total estimated cost of the repair; and 
(B) the total dollar amount the consumer is 
responsible to pay for the repair, which dollar 
amount may not exceed the applicable deductible 
or other copay arrangement in the consumer's 
insurance policy; or 
(ii) requests or collects from a consumer an 
amount that exceeds the dollar amount a consumer 
was initially told he was responsible to pay as an 
insurance deductible or other copay arrangement for 
a motor vehicle repair under Subsection (2)(p)(i), even 
if that amount is less than the full amount the motor 
vehicle insurance policy requires the insured to pay 
as a deductible or other copay arrangement, unless: 
(A) the consumer's insurance company denies 
that coverage exists for the repair, in which case, 
the full amount of the repair may be charged and 
collected from the consumer; or 
(B) the consumer misstates, before the repair 
is commenced, the amount of money the insur-
ance policy requires the consumer to pay as a 
deductible or other copay arrangement, in which 
case, the supplier may charge and collect from 
the consumer an amount that does not exceed the 
amount the insurance policy requires the con-
sumer to pay as a deductible or other copay 
arrangement. 1999 
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13-11-5. UnconscionabJe act or practice by supplier. 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in 
connection with a consumer t ransact ion violates this act 
whether it occurs before, du i ing , or after the transact ion. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question 
of law for the court. If it is claimed or appears to the court tha t 
an act or practice may be unconscionable, the par t ies shall be 
given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its 
set t ing, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making i ts 
determinat ion. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscio-
nable, the court shall consider circumstances which the sup-
plier knew or had reason to know. 1973 
13-11-6. Service of process. 
In addition to any other method provided by rule or statute, 
personal jurisdiction over a supplier may be acquired in a civil 
action or proceeding instituted in the district court by the 
service of process in the following manner. If a supplier 
engages in any act or practice in this state governed by this 
act, or engages in a consumer transaction subject to this act, 
he may designate an agent upon whom service of process may 
be made in this state. The agent must be a resident of or a 
corporation authorized to do business in this state. The 
designation must be in writing and filed with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code. If no designation is made 
and filed, or if process cannot be served in this state upon the 
designated agent, whether or not the supplier is a resident of 
this state or is authorized to do business in this state, process 
may be served upon the director of the Division of Corpora-
tions and Commercial Code, but service upon him is not 
effective unless the plaintiff promptly mails a copy of the 
process and pleadings by registered or certified mail to the 
defendant at his last reasonably ascertainable address. An 
affidavit of compliance with this section must be filed with the 
clerk of the court on or before the return day of the process, if 
any, or within any future time the court allows. i99i 
13-11-7. Duties of enforcing authority — Confidential-
ity of identity of persons investigated — Civil 
penalty for violation of restraining or injunc-
tive orders. 
(1) The enforcing author i ty shall: 
(a) enforce this chapter throughout the state; 
(b) cooperate with s ta te and local officials, officials of 
other s ta tes , and officials of the federal government in the 
adminis t ra t ion of compnrablo s ta tu tes : 
tc) inform consumers and suppliers on a continuing 
basis of the provisions of th is chapter and of acts or 
practices t ha t violate this chapter including mail ing in-
formation concerning final judgments to persons who 
request it, for which he may charge a reasonable fee to 
cover the expense; 
(d) receive and act on complaints; and 
(e) mainta in n public file of final judgment s rendered 
under this chapter tha t have been ei ther reported offi-
cially or made available (or public dissemination under 
Subsection (lMc), final consent judgments , and to the 
extent the enforcing author i ty considers appropria te , as-
surances of voluntary compliance. 
(2) In carrying out his duties, the enforcing authority may 
not publicly disclose the identity of a person investigated 
unless his identity has become a matter of public record in mi 
enforcement proceeding or he has consented to public disclo-
sure. 
(3) On motion of the enforcing authority, or on its own 
motion, the court may impose a civil penalty of not more than 
$5,000 for each day a temporary res t ra in ing order, prelimi-
na ry injunction, or permanent injunction issued under this. 
chapter is violated, if the supplier received notice of t^ 
res t ra in ing or injunctive order. Civil penal t ies imposed under 
this section shall be paid to the General Fund .
 l9^ 
13-11-8. Powers of enforcing authority. 
\\) T h e enforcing author i ty m a y conduct TeBearch, hold 
public hear ings , m a k e inquir ies , and publ ish Btudies relating 
to consumer sales acts or practices. 
(2) The enforcing author i ty shal l adopt substant ive rulpg 
t h a t prohibit with specificity acts or practices t h a t violate 
Section 13-11-4 and appropr ia te procedural rules . i 9 7 a 
13-11-9. Rule-making requirements. 
(1) In addition to complying with other rule-making re-
qui rements imposed by this act, the enforcing author i ty shall: 
fa) adopt as a rule a description of the organization of 
his office, s ta t ing the general course and method of 
operation of his office and method whereby the public may 
obtain information or make submissions or requests ; 
tb) adopt rules of practice se t t ing forth the na tu re and 
requi rements of all formal and informal procedures avail, 
able, including a description of the forms and instructions 
used by the enforcing author i ty of his office; and 
(c) make available for public inspection all rules , writ-
ten s t a t emen t s of policy, and in terpre ta t ions formulated, 
adopted, or used by the enforcing au thor i ty in discharging 
his functions. 
(2) A rule of the enforcing author i ty is invalid, and may not 
be invoked by the enforcing author i ty for any purpose, until it 
ha s been made available for public inspection unde r Subsec-
tion t l ) . This provision does not apply to a person who has 
knowledge of a rule before engaging in an act or practice that 
violates this act. 197s 
13-11-10 to 13-11-15. R e p e a l e d . 19B:I, 1988 
13-11-16. Investigatory powers of enforcing authority. 
(1) If, by his own inquiries or as a resu l t of complaints, the 
enforcing author i ty has reason to believe tha t a person has 
engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in a n act or 
practice t h a t violates this act, he may admin is te r oaths and 
affirmations, subpoena witnesses or mat ter , and collect evi-
dence. 
\2) If mat te r t h a t t he enforcing au thor i ty subpoenas is 
located outside this s ta te , the person subpoenaed may either 
m a k e it available to the enforcing au thor i ty a t a convenient 
location within the s t a t e or pay the reasonable and necessary 
expenses for the enforcing author i ty or his representa t ive to 
examine the ma t t e r a t the place where it is located. The 
enforcing author i ty may designate representa t ives , including 
officials of the s ta te in which the m a t t e r is located, to inspect 
the ma t t e r on his behalf, and he may respond to similar 
reques ts from officials of other s ta tes . 
(3) Upon failure of a person wi thout lawful excuse to obey a 
subpoena and upon reasonable notice to all persons affected, 
the enfoicing author i ty may apply to the court for an order 
compelling compliance. 
(4) In the event a witness asser t s a privilege against 
self-incrimination, test imony and evidence from the witness 
may be compelled p u r s u a n t to Title 77, Chap te r 22b, Grants of 
Immunity. 1997 
13-11-17. Actions by enforcing authority. 
(1) The enforcing author i ty may bring a n action: 
(a) to obtain a declaratory j u d g m e n t t h a t an act or 
practice violates this chapter ; 
(b) to enjoin, in accordance with the principles of eq-
uity, a supplier who has violated, is violating, or is 
otherwise likely to violate this chapter; and 
(c) to recover, for each violation, ac tual damages , or 
obtain relief under Subsection (2Kb), on behalf of consum-
ers who complained to the enforcing authority within a 
reasonable time alter it instituted proceedings under this 
chapter. 
(2) fa) The enforcing authority mav bring a class action on 
behalf of consumers for the actual damages caused by an 
act or practice specified as violating this chapter in a rule 
adopted by the enforcing authority under Subsection 
13-11-8(2) before the consumer transactions on which the 
action is based, or declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 
13-11-5 by final judgment of courts of general jurisdiction 
and appellate courts of this state that was either reported 
officially or made available for public dissemination under 
Subsection 13-11-7(1 Kc) by the enforcing authority ten 
days before the consumer transactions on which the 
action is based, or, with respect to a supplier who agreed 
to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent 
judgment that became final before the consumer transac-
tions on which the action is based, 
(b) (i) On motion of the enforcing authority and with-
out bond in an action under this subsection, the court 
may make appropriate orders, including appointment 
of a master oi receiver or sequestration of assets, but 
only if it appears that the defendant is threatening or 
is about to remove, conceal, or dispose of the defen-
dant's property to the damage of persons for whom 
relief is requested. An appropriate order may include 
an order: 
(A) to reimburse consumers found to have 
been damaged; 
(B) to carry out a transaction in accordance 
with consumers* reasonable expectations; 
(C) to strike or limit the application of uncon-
scionable clauses of contracts to avoid an uncon-
scionable result: or 
(D) to grant other appropriate relief. 
(ii) The court may assess the expenses of a master 
or receiver against a supplier, 
(r) If an act or practice that violates this chapter 
unjustly enriches a supplier and damages can be com-
puted with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on 
behalf of consumers who cannot be located with due 
diligence shall be transferred to the state treasurer pur-
suant to Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act. 
(d) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a violation of this chapter resulted from a 
bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of pro-
cedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recovery 
under Subsection (2) is limited to the amount, if an}', by 
which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation. 
(e) An action may not be brought by the enforcing 
authority under Subsection (2) more than two years after 
the occurrence of a violation of this chapter. 
13) (a) The enforcing authority may terminate an investi-
gation or an action other than a class action upon accep-
tance of the supplier's written assurance of voluntary 
compliance with this chapter. Acceptance of an assurance 
way be conditioned on a commitment to reimburse con-
sumers or take other appropriate corrective action. 
'b) An assurance is not evidence of a prior violation of 
this chapter. Unless an assurance has been rescinded by 
agreement of the parties or voided by a court for good 
cause, subsequent failure to comply with the terms of an 
assurance is prima facie evidence of a violation. 
*4) (a) In addition to other penalties and remedies set out 
under this chapter, and in addition to its other enforce-
ment powers under Title 13, Chapter 2, Division of 
Consumer Protection, the division director may issue a 
c ease and desist order and impose an administrative fine 
o f
 up to $1,000 for each violation of this chapter. 
(hi All money received through administrative fines 
imposed under this section shall be deposited in the 
Consumer Protection Education and Training Fund cre-
ated by Section 13-2-8. 1995 
13-11-17.5. Costs and attorney's fees. 
Any judgment granted in favor of the enforcing authority in 
connection with the enforcement ol this chapter shall include, 
in addition to any other monetary award or injunctive relief, 
an award of reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and costs of 
investigation 1987 
13-11-18. Noncompliance by supplier subject to other 
state supervis ion — Cooperation of enforcing 
authority and other official or agency. 
(1) If the enforcing authority receives a complaint or other 
information relating to noncompliance with this act by a 
supplier who is subject to other supervision in this state, the 
enforcing authoiity shall inform the official or agency having 
that supervision The enforcing authority may request infor-
mation about suppliers from the official or agency. 
(2) The enforcing authority and any other official or agency 
in this state having supervisory authority over a supplier shall 
consult and assist each othei in maintaining compliance with 
this act. Within the scope of their authority, they may jointly 
or separately make investigations, prosecute suits, and take 
other official aetifin they consider appropriate. 1973 
13-11-19. Actions by consumer. 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise 
has an adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an 
action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or prac-
tice violates this chapter; and 
(bl enjoin, in accordance with the.principles of equity, a 
supplier who has violated, is violating, or is likely to 
violate this chapter. 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of 
this chapter may recover, but not in a class action, actual 
damages or $2,000, whichever ib greater, plus court costs. 
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover 
damages or has an adequate remedy at law, he may bring a 
class action for declaratory judgment, an injunction, and 
appropriate ancillary relief against an act or practice that 
violates this chapter. 
(4) la) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation 
of this chanter may bring a class action for the actual 
damages caused by an act or practice specified as violat-
ing this chapter by a rule adopted by the enforcing 
authority under Subsection 13-11-8(2) before the con-
sumer transactions on which the action is based, or 
declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a final 
judgment of the appropriate court or courts of general 
jurisdiction and appellate courts of this state that was 
either officially reported or made available for public 
dissemination under Subsection 13-11-71 Die) by the en-
forcing authority ten da \ s before the consumer transac-
tions on which the action is based, or with respect to a 
supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited specifically by 
the terms of a consent judgment which became final 
before the consumer transactions on which the action is 
ha*ed. 
*b) If an act or piactice that violates this chapter 
unjustly enriches a supplier and the damages can be 
computed with reasonable certainty, damages recmerable 
on behalf cf consumers who cannot be located with due 
diligence .shall he tmneferred to the state treasurer pur-
suant to Tjtie ti7, Chnplei -H. (Unclaimed Property Act. 
(c> If a supplier sliow« by a preponderance of the 
evide?ice that a violation of this chapter resulted from a 
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bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of pro-
cedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recovery 
under this section is limited to the amount, if any, in 
which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation. 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing author-
ity, the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable 
attorney's fee limited to the work reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that 
violates this chapter has brought or maintained an action 
he knew to be groundless; or a supplier has committed an 
act or practice that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by 
a judgment or required by the court to be settled under 
Subsection 13-ll-21(lXa). 
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is 
taken, a final judgment in favor of the enforcing authority 
under Section 13-11-17 is admissible as prima facie evidence 
of the facts on which it is based in later proceedings under this 
section against the same person or a person in privity with 
him. 
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the 
prevailing party shall mail a copy to the enforcing authority 
for inclusion in the public file maintained under Subsection 
13-ll-7(l)(e). 
(8) An action under this section must be brought within two 
years after occurrence of a violation of this chapter, or within 
one year after the termination of proceedings by the enforcing 
authority with respect to a violation of this chapter, whichever 
is later. When a supplier sues a consumer, he may assert as a 
counterclaim any claim under this chapter arising out of the 
transaction on which suit is brought. 1995 
13-11-20. Class actions. 
(1) An action may be maintained as a class action under 
this act only if: 
(a) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable; 
(b) there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class; 
(c) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 
(d) the representative parties will fairly and ad-
equately protect the interests of the class; and 
(e) either: 
(i) the prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk 
of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with 
respect to individual members of the class which 
would establish incompatible standards of con-
duct for the party opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class that would as a practical 
matter dispose of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to protect 
their interests; or 
(ii) the party opposing the class has acted or re-
Cvis^ d to act QW £CQ\w\ds ^wwally &\t$lk»h\g to the, 
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect 
to the class as n whole; or 
(iii) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient ndjudica-
tion of the con trovers v. 
(2) The matters pertinent to th*-* findings under Subsection 
(lXe)(iii) include: 
la) the interest of members of the class in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
(b) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already commenced by or against mem. 
bers of the class; 
(c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating 
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 
(d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the man-
agement of a class action. 
(3) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by 
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this 
subsection may be conditional, and it may be amended before 
decision on the merits. 
(4) In a class action maintained under Subsection (l)(e) the 
court may direct to the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
notice to each member who can be identified through reason-
able effort. The notice shall advise each member that: 
(a) the court will exclude him from the class, unless he 
requests inclusion, by a specified date; 
(b) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include 
all members who request inclusion; and 
(c) a member who requests inclusion may, if he desires, 
enter an appearance through his counsel. 
(6) When appropriate, an action may be brought or main-
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or a 
class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated 
as a class. 
(6) In the conduct of a class action the court may make 
appiopriate orders: 
(a) determining the course of proceedings or prescrib-
ing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication 
in the presentation of evidence or argument; 
(b) requiring, for the protection of the members of the 
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that 
notice be given in the manner the court directs to some or 
all of the members or to the enforcing authority of any 
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the 
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify 
whether they consider the representation fair and ad-
equate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or 
otherwise to come into the action; 
(c) imposing conditions on the representative parties or 
on intervenors; 
(d) requiring that the pleadings be amended to elimi-
nate allegations as to representation of absent persons, 
and that the action proceed accordingly; or 
(e) dealing with similar procedural matters. 
(7) A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without approval of the court. Notice of the proposed dismissal 
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class as the 
court directs. 
(8) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action 
under Subsection (l)(e)(i) or (ii), whether or not favorable to 
the class, shall describe those whom the court finds to be 
members of the class. The judgment in a class action under 
Subsection tlXeXui). whether or not Favorable to the class, 
shall specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in 
Subsection (4) was directed, and who have requested inclu-
sion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class. 
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13-11-21. Settlement of class action — Complaint in 
class action delivered to enforcing authority. 
(1) (a) A defendant in a class action may file a written offer 
of settlement. If it is not accepted within a reasonable 
time by a plaintiff class representative, the defendant 
may file an affidavit reciting the rejection. The court may 
determine that the offer has enough merit to present to 
